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Courts, commentators, and practitioners have for too long
viewed intellectual property law as a discrete discipline, without
putting it into the proper theoretical context of general jurisprudence.
Intellectual property law cannot and must not exist on its own, outside
the normative framework of overlapping legal institutions. Even
within the rubric of intellectual property, courts have overlooked the
potential for cross-applying relevant doctrines between patent,
copyright, and trademark law. Certainly, when intellectual property
disputes touch on other disciplines, such as civil procedure, contract,
or tort law, courts have tended to overlook their synergies, focusing
instead on only one of several important policies or principles. The
result has gone beyond missed opportunities. It has led to judicial
mistakes, including in the very recent, and broad-based, 2007 U.S.
Supreme Court case of Medlmmune v. Genentech. The Court's errors
have far-reaching implications for the future of the law and its
practice.
Utilizing graphic illustrations in tables and diagrams, this
article proposes a more appropriate interdisciplinary framework for
resolving disputes that cross legal disciplines. In what this article
refers to as "cross-over disputes, " courts, litigants, and license
negotiators should employ this article's proposed matrix in order to
reach more rational and informed decisions.
t United States Federal Judge, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board; Former Assistant
Professor, Florida State University School of Law; Former Intellectual Property Manager
UCLA; J.D. Columbia University School of Law; B.A. Stanford University. Many thanks to
Professors Mark A. Lemley, Scott Kieff, Lee Petherbridge, and Curtis Bridgeman for reviewing
prior drafts and adding to the discussion. Thanks also to the scholars who provided helpful
comment at the Works in Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium 2007 (American University
School of Law).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts, commentators, and practitioners have for too long
viewed intellectual property law as a discrete discipline, without
putting it into the proper theoretical context of general jurisprudence.
Intellectual property law cannot and must not exist on its own, outside
the normative framework of overlapping legal institutions. Even
within the rubric of intellectual property, courts have overlooked the
potential for cross-applying relevant doctrines between patent,
copyright, and trademark law. Certainly, when intellectual property
disputes touch on other disciplines, such as civil procedure, contract,
or tort law, courts have tended to overlook their synergies, focusing
instead on only one of several important policies or principles. The
result has gone beyond missed opportunities. It has led to judicial
mistakes, including in the very recent, and broad-based, 2007 U.S.
Supreme Court case of MedImmune v. Genentech.' The Court's errors
have far-reaching implications for the future of the law and its
practice.
This article examines the intersection of normative values
between intellectual property and contract law. Utilizing graphic
illustrations in tables and diagrams, the article proposes a more
appropriate interdisciplinary framework for resolving cases that cross
disciplines, such as those involving intellectual property licensing.2
The article refers to such cases as "cross-over disputes." Interestingly,
in its 2008 term, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on a cross-
over dispute involving intellectual property licensing. As discussed in
Part V, infra, the Court disappointingly once again missed an
opportunity to consider the intersection of patent law and contract
doctrine, and instead presumed the primacy of patent doctrine with
barely a footnote about contract law. With the current state of the law,
still in future cross-over disputes, courts, litigants, and license
negotiators may employ this article's proposed matrix in order to
reach more rational and informed decisions.
The analysis begins by addressing parties' "right to license."
What may appear to be a straightforward question of contractual
1. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
2. A prior article discussed the intersection of normative values between intellectual
property and a particular area of civil procedure: declaratory judgment standards. See Lorelei
Ritchie de Larena, Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property
Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957 (2008) [hereinafter Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment]. This article
examines the intersection of normative values between intellectual property and contract law in
the realm of intellectual property licensing.
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authority has actually not been treated as a contractual matter at all.
Part II of this article discusses the various issues that must be
examined in order to determine the ability and authority of private
parties to enter into a license agreement. First, Part II(A) examines the
commonalities between patent, copyright, and trademark law. This
section shows that while each of the three main branches of
intellectual property has unique qualities to consider, their underlying
normative values are substantially similar and may be addressed
together. Next, Part II(B) provides a normative analysis of each of
these three main branches of intellectual property, including a
representation (Table I) of the competing interests of creators, their
competitors, and the public, as these vary between patent, copyright,
and trademark doctrine.
The article goes on to examine the normative values of contract
law in Part II(C), presenting a graphic illustration of the competing
interests between the private right to contract and the need for
limitations (Table II). The article then draws on these illustrations to
provide an interdisciplinary framework for properly viewing the
convergence of contract and intellectual property law, showing that
there is substantial overlap in their normative values. This analysis is
set forth in Part II(D), with an illustrative diagram (Diagram A) that
demonstrates the many areas where contract and intellectual property
law converge. The article proceeds to discuss the perceived
divergence between contract and intellectual property law, a red
herring that has led courts to overlook the importance of weighing
contract doctrine in the balance for cases involving intellectual
property licensing. As this section suggests, and Diagram B
illustrates, the perceived "divergence" between contract and
intellectual property law is actually no more than a recasting of the
actual convergence of contractual illegality-a particular area that fits
within standard contract doctrine-and intellectual property law.
The article then utilizes the proposed framework from Part II to
analyze the phenomenon of the "adverse contract." The discussion
includes an examination of U.S. Supreme Court decisions from
various points in time, up through the current term, and examines how
the Court has repeatedly reached incorrect legal conclusions by
overlooking the importance of taking an interdisciplinary approach to
cases involving intellectual property licensing. Part III(A) discusses
the legend of "licensee estoppel," wherein the Court actually cast
aside relevant contract law entirely, thereby setting up a confusing
and untenable framework for future licensing decisions. Part III(B)
explains the importance of taking an interdisciplinary approach in
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cases involving intellectual property licensing. This includes, where
relevant, adding civil procedure to the balance of normative values,
rather than casting aside an important area of law in favor of just one
perhaps valuable, but not necessarily dominant, doctrine. Diagram C
graphically illustrates, and Table III further analyzes, the convergence
of values between contract doctrine, intellectual property law, and
civil procedure.
By overlooking this important interdisciplinary approach, the
Supreme Court has created utter confusion regarding the rights of
licensing parties, as examined in Part III(C). The outstanding issues
are analyzed in Table IV. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
correct its earlier mistake by providing a more comprehensive
framework in the 2007 through Medlmmune. Unfortunately, as
discussed in Part IV, the Supreme Court again missed the mark, by
casting aside the normative values of contract law instead of properly
weighing them in the balance.
As a result, Part V draws on the matrix proposed in this article
and accompanying tables to more accurately answer outstanding
questions regarding intellectual property licensing, as well as to
provide courts (notwithstanding the Supreme Court's 2008 Quanta v.
LG Electronics3 decision), litigants, and license negotiators with an
appropriate interdisciplinary framework for addressing issues that are
truly at the convergence of contract and intellectual property law. The
results are summarized in Table V. This interdisciplinary solution
may be applied to other cross-over disputes-to bring the analysis
properly in line with the principles of general jurisprudence.
II. THE RIGHT TO LICENSE
A. Examination of Commonalities in Intellectual Property
The normative values of intellectual property law are subject to
ongoing debate amongst Congress, courts, and commentators. 4
Generally, intellectual property law must balance various incentives
between creators, their competitors, and the public.5 The balance is
3. Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).
4. Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment, supra note 2, at 960, 974-76, 986-97.
5. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated the competing objectives of patent law, which are
similar to those of copyright and trademark:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes
disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the
public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public
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calculated using slightly different indicia in each of the three major
branches of intellectual property.6 On the whole, though, the
underlying values are essentially equivalent for patent, copyright, and
trademark law.7
Indeed, patent and copyright law derive from common
Constitutional origins.8 For this reason, courts are apt to apply useful
doctrines-such as third party liability, misuse, licensee estoppel, and
remedies-from one to the other. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court has made
the case for sharing doctrines several times, including in the landmark
1984 case of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,10 and in the more
recent 2006 case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange.t l The eBay court
domain remain there for the free use of the public.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
6. Compare Id. (patents), and Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
198 (1985) ("The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure to
the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers"), with Sony Corp. of Am, v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating the purpose of copyrights is "to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.").
7. Where relevant, this article also examines issues as they occur or differ in trade secret
law.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
9. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1192-93 (2000); see also Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright
Teaches Patent Law About "Fair Use" and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR.
L. REV. 779, 802-03 (2005); cf Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer; Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 941 (2007) (cautioning against blanketly applying patent law principles to copyright law.
Professors Menell and Nimmer dispute the wisdom of the Sony Court's famous application of
patent law to a copyright case, since they argue that direct copyright principles and law should
have been considered more relevant. The argument is interesting, but applies mainly to liability,
and to issues where there is strong precedent within the direct law-as they state was the situation
with copyright and vicarious infringement liability. In fact, though, there are various issues
where it is entirely appropriate to cross-apply patent and copyright doctrines in order to
standardize them appropriately. Meanwhile, Professor O'Rourke and other commentators have
pointed out that beyond Sony, there is indeed other historic kinship between patent and
copyright law.).
10. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). The
Court in Sony extended the doctrine of vicarious infringement from patent to copyright, stating:
"The closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer
because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law."
11. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-93 (2006) (considering the
then-current presumption of injunctions in patent cases, and ultimately dismissing the
presumption in favor of applying the standard 4-factor injunction test as applied in copyright
cases. Interestingly, it appears that the Supreme Court did not realize that, while copyright
holders may not enjoy a legal presumption of injunction, in practice, courts do routinely grant
them.).
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considered the viability of presumptive injunctions in patent law.12
The Court did not simply stop at an analysis of patent law however,
but turned also to copyright law for persuasive analogy.1 3 The Court
observed that although patent owners are given a presumption of
injunctive relief, copyright owners are instead subject to the
traditional 4-part inquiry used in general jurisprudence to determine
whether an injunction should issue in a particular case. 14 Reasoning
that patent law has a similar development and grant of rights to
copyright law,' 5 and that both use the same terminology regarding
remedies, 6 the Court determined that patent owners should be equally
subject to the 4-part inquiry and should no longer be granted
presumptive injunctions.' 7 In so stating, the Supreme Court neatly
discarded a near century of patent precedent in favor of an apparently
better standard articulated in copyright law.18
Trademark law, which has different origins but some common
issues,' 9 is frequently included in the cross-pollination of intellectual
property law. Courts have, for example, applied the doctrine of first
sale (rights exhaustion) equally to trademark law, as an analogue to
patent and copyright.20 Furthermore, as a basic administrative setup,
the U.S. government combines patent and trademark grants and
administration into one agency, the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12. ld at 391-92.
13. Id. at 392.
14. Id.
15. Id. (explaining that patents have similar grants of exclusivity as copyrights).
16. Id. ("Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts 'may' grant
injunctive relief ... ").
17. Id. at 391.
18. Since a 1908 Supreme Court decision, injunctions had been the presumed remedy in
patent law. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908). Interestingly,
the Supreme Court has also shown a recent trend toward keeping patent law aligned with
general jurisprudence. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 201-02
(2005); eBay, 547 U.S. at 392; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-31
(2007). This is important since patent appeals do not benefit from the competitive nature of
regional circuit courts, but rather are all funneled through the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
It has been argued that patent law, too, might benefit from more competition between courts,
with the addition of at least one other circuit hearing patent appeals. See Craig Allen Nard &
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619 (2007);
cf R. Polk.Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).
19. It is generally accepted that trademark law derives from common law and that, on the
federal level, Congress' power to regulate trademarks stems from the Commerce clause. See
United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 94-98 (1879); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989).
20. Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d. 1443, 1448 (11 th Cir. 1998).
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Office. Finally, Congress has recently considered consolidating the
Lanham Act, governing trademark rights and infringement, into Title
35 with patent law.21 It is therefore useful to consider trademark law
alongside patent and copyright law when considering their normative
values.
B. Normative Analysis of Intellectual Property Law
In patent law, there is a precarious balance that easily topples
with the addition of misguided legislation by Congress in addition to
muddled interpretation by courts. Inventors-and more frequently their
assignees-must be rewarded with patents for their protectable ideas,
as an incentive to create and invest in technology development. The
public must then be rewarded with full disclosure of the inventive
steps, with, of course, the assurance that only truly patentable
inventions will receive the exclusionary patent grant. Finally,
competing inventors-and companies-must be rewarded with their
own opportunities to obtain patents on improvements and work-
around technology. Of course, that all begs the question of how these
countervailing balances should be weighed.
"Economic efficiency demands the availability of patent
protection as much as it requires that such protection be subject to
legal challenge."22 On the one hand, patents are necessary to
encourage investment in various industries that bring products and
processes of great value to the consuming public. 23 On the other hand,
weak and invalid patents must not be permitted to overshadow the
marketplace. To that end, the U.S. Supreme Court has mandated that
21. Recently, Congress considered a bill to recodify the Lanham Act from Title 15 to
Title 35. The bill was introduced to the House Judiciary Committee of the 2d Session of the
109th Congress in 2006 by Representatives Sensenbrenner and Conyers. The bill expresses
"conformity with original intent" to consolidate patent and trademark law, and states an
objective to "reflect the emergence of intellectual property law as a distinct field of law" and a
"cohesive unit." STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., To ENACT CERTAIN
LAWS RELATING TO TRADEMARKS AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS SUBTITLES III
AND IV OF TITLE 35, UNITED STATES CODE, AND TO REDESIGNATE THAT TITLE AS "PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY" (Comm. Print 2006), available at
http://U.S.C.ode.house.gov/cod/t35/20060425exp.pdf. See also To Enact Certain Laws Relating
to Trademarks and Other Intellectual Property as Subtitles III and IV of Title 35, United States
Code, and to Redesignate that Title as "Patents, Trademarks, and Other Intellectual Property,"
H.R. XXXX, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://U.S.C.ode.house.gov/cod/t35/20060425bill.pdf.
22. Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment, supra note 2, at 974.
23. Patents are more likely to incentivize innovation in industries where research and
development costs are highest.
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while patents are given a presumption of validity,24 once invalidity is
proven in court, the patent is rendered unenforceable against even
25third parties.
As a normative value, predictability is of prime importance both
to the patentee and to potential infringers who must make business
decisions based on the validity and enforceability of the patent.26 This
is becoming difficult in the current political and legal climate where
interestingly, each of the three branches of federal government is
concurrently pursuing patent reform, and not all in the same direction.
In a 2005 case, Merck KGaA v. Integra,27 the Supreme Court
expanded the interpretation of statutory fair use in patent law in cases
where the purported infringement may lead to drug discovery and
development.28 Furthermore, in eBay in 2006, the Supreme Court
modified the nearly century-old presumption of injunction in patent
cases, thereby tipping the scales toward compulsory licensing.
29
Congress, meanwhile, has been up in arms over the past couple of
years with different congressmen endorsing half a dozen different
patent reform bills, any of which might significantly affect the
practice of patent law in the United States.3 ° Within the executive
branch, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is pursuing various
methods of increasing quality and timeliness of patent applications. 3 1
Everyone, from business owners to scholars, agrees that the
current patent system faces significant hurdles, but even within the
typical dividing lines, there is no clear agreement on solutions. In the
January 2007 Supreme Court decision involving licensee estoppel,
various law professors and industry experts filed briefs in support of
24. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 335 (1971).
25. Id. at 349-50.
26. Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment, supra note 2, at 975.
27. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
28. Id. at 202. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) reads, in relevant part: "It shall not be an act of
infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or import ... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."
29. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).
30. The latest round of proposed patent reform legislation, currently pending as of
September 2008, consists of provisions aimed, again, at including a post-grant opposition, as
well as some damages reapportionment and broader rulemaking authority for the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). See also, Patent
Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2008); S. REP. No. 110-259 (2008), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_congreports&docid=f:sr259. I10.pdf.
31. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007-2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 33,
35 (2007), http://www.uspto.govlweb/offices/comlstrat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf.
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petitioner (licensee) 32 and others filed in support of respondents
(licensors),33 demonstrating the differing interests in this debate.
Following recent precedent, the Supreme Court again favored user
rights by lowering the bar for validity challenges by active licensees.
34
Later in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court further tipped the balance
toward user rights by broadening the standard by which inventions
may be deemed "obvious" and therefore unpatentable.
35
In copyright law, the incentive structure is generally similar to
that of patent law, although the balance of interests is somewhat
differently aligned. In copyright law, the main interests less
frequently include competitors who develop similar ideas,36 and more
frequently substitute users, including technology companies charged
with third-party liability.37 Since copyrights are obtained simply by
registration rather than by a governmental review process, they are
not given the same presumption of validity as are issued patents.
38
This slight distinction has some repercussions in the equities
considered for licensing.39 The lower bar to challenge copyright
compared with patent validity would seem to favor users' rights. The
relatively long duration of copyrights compared to patents, however,
weighs in the other direction. 40 On the whole, while the specifics are
32. See Brief of Three Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (No. 05-608), 2006 WL
1355595.
33. See Brief of Professors John R. Allison et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (No. 05-608), 2006
WL 2126860.
34. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). As discussed in Part IV of
this article, infra, the ruling in this particular case was misguided due to the Supreme Court's
misunderstanding of patent law and licensing practice. Nevertheless, it evidences the trend
toward user rights.
35. KSR Int'l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739-41 (2007).
36. This is particularly less relevant in copyright law since, unlike patent law, there is an
absolute defense of independent creation, as well as a full statutory doctrine of fair use, codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
37. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984);
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
38. The U.S. Copyright Office may deny a registration, but rarely does so. Due to the
relatively less rigorous process, copyright registration is only prima facie evidence of copyright
ownership. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2000).
39. See Part II(E) of this article, infra, regarding applications of misuse doctrine in
invalidity cases.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (stating that the patent term is 20 years from an
effective filing date); 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (stating that the copyright term is 70 years beyond
the authors death; but the work for hire term is the earlier of 95 years from publication or 120
years from creation).
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different (see Table I infra), the overall balancing factors are similar
in patent and copyright law.
Trademark law, meanwhile, is more similar to patent law in
some key aspects, and more similar to copyright in others. Regarding
rights accrual, trademark more closely follows copyright's automatic
grant upon creation (or in trademark law, use in commerce). 4 1 In its
more rigorous agency review before federal grant however, trademark
law more closely resembles patent law. Meanwhile, trademark law is
different from either patent or copyright in that it is not pre-empted by
federal jurisdiction in the Lanham Act, but may also exist as a state
cause of action.
42
In practice, trade secret protection is generally viewed as an
alternative to patenting a technology. Being based in the common
law, trade secret misappropriation is a state, not federal, claim. 43 Like
most torts, trade secret liability can vary greatly by state, although
most have eradicated that disparity by enacting the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, which serves to standardize the elements.44
The balance of normative values between the respective stake
holders in patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret law is
illustrated graphically in Table I, infra, in Appendix (Tables).
C. Normative Analysis of Contract Law
Contracts are legally enforceable agreements.45 However, the
basics of first year Contracts courses teach us that not all agreements
are enforceable as contracts.4 6 The agreement may be overly
41. Registration is necessary to maintain a federal action in patent (via grant), copyright,
17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000), and trademark actions (under the Lanham Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(2000).
42. See Colonial Penn Group, Inc. v. Colonial Deposit Co., 834 F.2d 229, 234 n.3 (1st
Cir. 1987) ("It cannot be argued that the Lanham Act has completely preempted state common
law service mark protection.").
43. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265-66 (1979).
44. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) has been enacted in forty five states, plus
two U.S. territories, including the District of Columbia, as of September 2008. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (2008),
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp.
45. See NEC Corp. v. Dep't. of Commerce, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1999) ("[A] promise or set of promises for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (in some cases, contracts may be said to constitute legally recognizable
rights). See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (3rd ed. 2004).
46. Contracts courses discuss the many and varied ways that parties can avoid
enforcement of their agreements.
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ambiguous, 47 illusory, 48 lacking consideration, 49 or disputed as to its
very existence. 50 Contracts may also be rescinded or have their
provisions struck on the basis of illegality, including
unconscionability, duress, or fraud.51
Overall, contract law is geared toward implementing the
reasonable expectations of parties.52 Another major goal of contract
law is to ensure the right of private parties to design their future
interests by assigning present value to probabilities of future
outcomes based on the information and belief of the parties-or in
some cases on the actual, sometimes even superior, knowledge of one
or the other.53 In this way, contract law encourages the resolution and
54
settlement of disputes that have arisen or that may arise.
These important normative values of contract law must be
balanced with the countervailing duty of good faith and fair dealing.55
The resulting balance of normative factors in contract law is
illustrated graphically in Table II, infra, in Appendix (Tables).
D. The Convergence of Contract and Intellectual Property Law
The intersection of contract and intellectual property law reveals
substantial overlap in their normative values. They share the general
value of satisfying the reasonable expectations of the parties involved,
as well as a balancing of interests between the relevant stake holders,
including the public. 56 Moreover, intellectual property rights, like
47. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (relating that
courts may impute intent by the parties if possible).
48. See United States. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 921 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 258 (N.Y. 1891).
50. See Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428, 429 (N.Y. 1928), as well as the classic
"Blackacre" case examples where acceptance is tendered too late.
51. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (mistake); Austin
Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (duress); Wollums v. Horsley,
20 S.W. 781 (Ky. 1892) (unconscionability).
52. See Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958); Batsakis v.
Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
54. See Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72, 74 (Conn. 1978); Marton
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985).
55. See Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1152-53; Austin Instrument, 272 N.E.2d at 535.
56. In intellectual property law, that presents a more fluid question as to identification of
the relevant "parties." Accordingly, Part II(B), supra, and Table I, infra, lay out the major stake
holders in the three main branches of intellectual property law (plus trade secret), including,
where relevant, the rights holder, competitors, users, and the public (a multi-faceted group of
taxpayers, consumers, and fellow citizens).
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contract rights, are primarily commercial.57  For these reasons,
intellectual property rights combine easily with contracts.
Specifically, intellectual property rights may be contracted ex ante
(before creation) or ex post (post-creation).58 The ex post contract may
be a full assignment or a license of varying degrees. Each of these
contracts has separate yet corresponding issues.
Employers commonly require new employees to sign contracts
agreeing in advance that the employee will assign rights in any
invention or other creation made during the term of employment.59
Savvy employers use substantially similar forms for independent
contractors, including those hired via purchase order, in order to
ensure that they do not get stuck paying full value for creation and
ending up with just a copy, rather than a copyright (or patent),
particularly where the purchaser believes that the creator has already
captured the full value in the initial sale. These contracts are often
applied to trade secrets, and are especially well-utilized in states like
California where covenants not to compete are unenforceable by
law.
60
Where copyrights are involved, these ex ante agreements to
assign may be styled as an alternative to a "work for hire"
arrangement. This is key to situations where the creation may not fit
into one of the specified categories necessary for establishment of a
57. While many rationales may be posited for the protection of intellectual property
rights, the government grant of rights in patent, copyright, and trademark law are all oriented
toward commercial use by the rights holder. This is clear from the remedies, which are oriented
toward damages, as per their tort origins (and sometimes injunctions, deriving from their oft
characterization as property rights). See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or
Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783 (2007) [hereinafter Property or
Liability Rules]. Trade secret law is by its very definition commercial, since it governs only that
which "derives independent economic value" from its secrecy. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985); see also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West 1997).
58. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, 2-23 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
59. Most sophisticated companies require such ex ante agreements, and increasingly
research universities do as well. E.g., UNIV. OF CAL., PATENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM,
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/patentac.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (form which all
new U. C. employees are required to sign).
60. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008). The California Supreme Court
recently decided on an interpretation of the statute, reaffirming that "covenants not to compete
are void, subject to several exceptions." Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 189 P.3d 285, 288
(Cal. 2008). This article's author signed onto an amicus brief with law professors and scholars
advocating the public policy behind prohibiting employee covenants not to compete.
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work for hire.61 Although Title 17 limits what may be considered a
"work for hire"-with corresponding repercussions on duration of
copyright and of assignment-Title 17 does not limit the rights of
parties to privately enter into ex ante contracts that will govern the
ownership of the future copyright creations.62
Overall, parties need to ensure that their intellectual property
contracts-whether ex ante or ex post-match the normative values of
contract as well as of intellectual property law, by fitting the
requirements described in Part II(C) of this article, supra,
(consideration, legality, etc.). For example, agreements to assign in
the future are sometimes deemed to lack present consideration.
63
Assignments of already-existing rights-or at least rights that are in
good faith believed by the parties to exist-fall nicely into the
intersection of normative values of contract and intellectual property
law, and are generally not problematic as long as the proper
requirements of contract law are followed.
Licensing presents the quintessential intersection of contract and
intellectual property law. More so than with any other contract
governing intellectual property rights, licensing pushes the normative
values of each to the test, requiring a very careful balance of interests.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently recognized that need for
balance in the realm of intellectual property licensing.64 As will be
examined further in Part IV however, the Court unfortunately veered
off course and failed to carefully contemplate contract law in the
balance.
The convergence of normative values between contract and
intellectual property law is illustrated graphically in Diagram A:
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 112004). Often these are styled as either/or contracts,
including language along the lines of:
The parties agree that this work is and will be deemed a work-for-hire under Title
17 of the United States Code. To the extent the work is not deemed a work-for-
hire by a competent court of law, the parties agree that Creator will, and hereby
does, assign all right, title, and interest in Work to Commissioning Party for good
and valuable consideration.
62. Although if not a statutory work for hire, even an ex ante contractual assignment will
be limited in time by the terms of 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
63. Therefore, parties may opt for present tense language such as: "X agrees to assign,
and hereby does assign, any and all right and interest in such inventions as may be created .... "
64. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-31 (2007). In other contexts,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized the need to reconcile principles of
contract law with intellectual property in the realm of licensing. See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., 487 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding common law contract principles,
and quoting Corbin on Contracts for support).
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DIAGRAM A
CONVERGENCE OF NORMATIVE VALUES BETWEEN CONTRACT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
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E. The Perceived Divergence of Contract and Intellectual
Property Law
Despite their generally smooth intersection of normative values,
contract and intellectual property law may appear to diverge in certain
key respects. Specifically, while contract law typically allows partiesto devise their own arrangements, there are certain overriding
normative restrictions in intellectual property law primarily involving
misuse, antitrust, estoppel, and consumer protection. These
restrictions are driven by the exclusive nature of most intellectual
property rights, including the exclusionary nature of patents,66 and the
similarly expansive nature of copyright.67 Due to the strength of the
intellectual property grant, together with the extraordinary right to
injunction as a (generally presumed) remedy,6 8 and the fact that they
65. Provided full and fair access to information. See Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d
1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
68. In the 2006 eBay case, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the automatic presumption
of injunction in patent law, but it continues to be the norm in most cases. eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). For further examination the proper rights
and remedies that should accrue to intellectual property owners, including in a post-eBay
system, see Property or Liability Rules, supra note 55.
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are essentially government-conferred rights,69 such restrictions are
necessary to maintain the precarious balance between the stake
holders, as illustrated in Table I of this article, infra, in Appendix:
(Tables).
Policy exceptions to free contracting in intellectual property law
may be attributable to a common misconception that intellectual
property owners have more leverage and hold greater bargaining
power than their licensees. This mistaken generalization has led to
some inconsistency in recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court,
including in its January 2007 MedImmune decision, discussed in Part
IV of this article, infra. Certainly sometimes misuse, antitrust, and
other restrictions in intellectual property licensing must be invoked,
but it is not necessary to cast aside contract doctrine in order to do so.
Instead, these intellectual property policies fit well within standard
contract doctrine, which limits illegal contracts.
70
Misuse occurs when a patentee tries to overreach the scope,
71term, or extent of its patent grant. In the licensing context, misuse
69. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks may be considered government-conferred rights
due to their registration and enforcement procedures.
70. Some scholars have argued that federal law's preemption may act as an impediment
to certain types of contracts, including intellectual property licenses. See Mark A. Lemley,
Beyond Preemption. The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV.
11l passim (1999) [hereinafter Beyond Preemption]. However, Professor Lemley was primarily
addressing an issue in the proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, which he argued would give undue
advantage to licensors. This article does not delve into the intricacies of how standard contract
law has been applied or abused, but merely suggests that it should not be viewed as diverging
from intellectual property law. Instead, this article suggests viewing misuse, antitrust, and
related issues as being at the convergence of contract illegality and intellectual property law. A
similar view was espoused by Professor Samuelson regarding the proposed Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) as properly viewed at the intersection of contract and
intellectual property law. See Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between
Intellectual Property Policy and UCITA are Likely to be Resolved, 570 ECOMMERCE
STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN THE DIGITAL ECoN. 741, 743-44 (Practicing Law Institute ed.,
1999); accord Pamela Samuelson, Foreword, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the
Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of
Transactions in Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998)
("Intellectual property and contract laws have a long history of working in concert to regulate
commercial transactions in information-rich works. Yet, as both bodies of law have expanded
their horizons to respond to the considerable challenges posed by digital technologies, the
relationship between these two laws has shifted."). See also David McGowan, Free Contracting,
Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information
Transactions, and "Aggressive Neutrality," 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998).
71. The remedy for misuse does not result in a final and binding holding of invalidity.
Instead, it constitutes an equitable remedy whereby the intellectual property right cannot be
enforced until the misuse has been corrected. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2000), which
limited the liability for patent misuse. For an innovative argument to limit the remedies available
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may be found where a patentee attempts to bind a licensee to
contractual obligations beyond the legal term of the patent (or
copyright). 2In that case, the normative values precluding misuse
must override the contractual right of parties to voluntarily enter a
willing bargain. On the other hand, accepting that parties to a license
agreement may take a gamble on the ultimate enforceability of the
subject patent claims, especially if the license agreement is completed
in advance of the patent grant, the Supreme Court has also found it
acceptable for parties to set a date certain for the term of the license
agreement, regardless of whether a pending patent ultimately issues.
3
Thus, a would-be patentee may bind a licensee to pay royalties on a
patent that never issues, as long as the licensor does not also attempt
to bind a licensee beyond the actual term of an issued patent.
The normative values of antitrust are also somewhat at odds with
those of intellectual property law. This provides for a constant and
ongoing normative debate amongst Congress, courts, and
commentators. While antitrust law seeks to avoid barriers to
competition, intellectual property rights are built on the premise of
exclusivity.7 4 The Federal Trade Commission issued a report in
October 2003 alleging, among other things, that patents provide a
potential antitrust risk.75 This is of course true, but only when patents
are misused, abused, or otherwise taken out of context.76
on patent misuse further, see David McGowan, What Tool Works Tells Us About Tailoring
Patent Misuse Remedies, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 208,214-15 (2007).
72. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1942); Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). This doctrine has been extended, by analogy, to copyright
law. See also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 passim (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
license provision barring licensee from developing competing software was misuse); DSC
Commc'ns Corp. v. DGI Techs, Inc. 81 F.3d 597, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1996).
73. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 261-63 (1979) (holding it is okay
for the parties to contract for lower royalties in the event no patent issues).
74. LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 20 (1977)
("As legislative history and case law both disclose, the general objective of the antitrust laws is
the maintenance of competition. Competition per se thus becomes a goal of the legal order. Yet,
competition is not a concept which defines itself; notions about the desirability of competition
may shape judgments about how the law should apply, at least at its indistinct edges."); Stewart
v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) ("An author holds a bundle of exclusive rights in the
copyrighted work ... ").
75. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf. The report was met with great interest in the
patent community, but some resentment as well, including by those who claimed that the report
evidenced a lack of understanding of the necessity of monopoly power inherent in the patent
grant. The FTC released a follow-up 210 page report, together with the Department of Justice.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007),
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There are several additional areas of tension between the private
right of contract and the strictures of intellectual property ownership.
Generally these arise in other contexts where, as with misuse or
antitrust violations, the intellectual property owner attempts to engage
in some improper or illegal activity. Consumer protection laws, for
example, may limit the ability of intellectual property owners to lock
unwitting buyers into adhesion contracts such as software
"shrinkwrap" or "clickwrap" licenses. 77 These laws do not present a
normative conflict however, since they are typically aligned with
general common law contract principles of good faith and fair
dealing. Estoppel also, which would (and should) be governed by
standard contractual principles, has instead been taken up by the U.S.
Supreme Court as a matter of intellectual property policy. 78 The
resulting confusion is examined in Part III of this article, infra.
Overall, it is unfortunate that courts have repeatedly latched onto the
red herring of a perceived "divergence" between contract and
intellectual property law, and as a result have based their decisions on
somewhat false pretenses, when instead they should be looking at this
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotinglnnovationandCompetitionrptO7O4.pdf. The
2007 report contains interesting commentary on various licensing practices and their potential
antitrust impact. The FTC acknowledges that "IP Licensing is generally procompetitive." Id. at
87.
76. A good example of this controversy is the recent case of In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007),
challenging the practice of "reverse payments" whereby a pharmaceutical patentee pays a
generic company with first rights to stay off the market. For more on reverse payment schemes
and their legality, see Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the
Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489 (2007).
77. Software licenses present the common tension in the apparent "divergence" between
contract and intellectual property law. Again, though, what appears to be a "divergence" is
generally just application of contractual protections, such as common law principles of adhesion
contract and overriding statutory consumer protections. Accordingly, although courts generally
allow broad contractual leeway, even in "clickwrap" and "shrinkwrap" licenses, parties must, of
course, abide by standard contractual requirements of "good faith and fair dealing." See, e.g.,
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Shrinkwrap licenses are
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general");
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an opportunity
to read terms online is sufficient, even if terms not discussed by representative on phone
purchase). Even cases that have taken a very negative view of clickwrap licensing have typically
relied on common law contract principles to thwart the clickwrap provisions. See, e.g., Specht v.
Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20, 26 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding arbitration provision not
disclosed up front in a clickwrap license was not binding, based on common law principles of
contract); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (denying
enforcement of clickwrap license based on contractual theories of adhesion and
unconscionability).
78. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 669-71 (1969).
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as just an overlap between intellectual property norms and the
proscription against illegality in contract doctrine.
The normative values in the perceived "divergence" between
contract and intellectual property law (that is to say, in the
convergence of intellectual property and contractual illegality) are
illustrated graphically in Diagram B, infra. Diagram B shows what is
not enforceable under the principles of relevant contract and
intellectual property doctrine.
DIAGRAM B
CONVERGENCE OF NORMATIVE VALUES BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL












III. THE ADVERSE CONTRACT
A. The Legend of Licensee Estoppel
Once upon a time, it was decreed across the land that a licensee
of a patent could not challenge its validity, now or evermore.7 9 The
concept was referred to as "licensee estoppel," and the rationale was
essentially that one cannot both benefit from a right and
79. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950)
(applying the doctrine of licensee estoppel to patent law).
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simultaneously challenge it.80 In the much-cited case of Lear v.
Adkins,8  however, the U.S. Supreme Court cleanly abolished the
doctrine of licensee estoppel in patent law.82 While the effect of the
Lear decision was sweeping,83 the Court's analysis in reaching its
ultimate conclusion was even more revealing, both for its high points
and for its flaws.
Interestingly, the Lear Court recognized licensee estoppel as
being at the intersection of patent and contract law.84 The Court did
not, however, see a possibility of balancing the laws' competing
normative values, but instead came up with a disappointingly black
and white analysis. 85 The Court focused on patent law in a vacuum,
and even within patent law, the Court failed to consider the complex
and competing demands of patent doctrine, 86 including the important
incentives created by patents.87 Instead, the Court basically held fast
to the singular principle that "all ideas in general circulation be
dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid
patent." 88 While true, this is only one piece of a larger puzzle both
within patent law and between patent and contract doctrine.
Therefore, the Court missed an opportunity to find common ground at
the intersection of contracts and intellectual property, instead opting
to say, simply, that the importance of challenging weak patents
overrides the importance of upholding general principles of contract
law.89 This was an unfortunate and unnecessary conclusion. In fact,
the Court could-and should-have reached the same holding,
80. Lear, 395 U.S. at 656.
81. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
82. Id. at 671, 674 n.19.
83. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive
to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 678-81 (1986).
84. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
85. The Lear decision has been criticized for adding to a mismatched incentive system,
whereby licensees have an unnaturally low bar to challenging patent validity, whereas non-
licensees have an unnaturally high bar for such challenges. See, Dreyfuss, supra note 83, at 757-
59. Indeed, since that article was published, these incentives have been thrown further afoul by
the Federal Circuit, and then by the U.S. Supreme Court in the January 2007 in Medlmmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
86. For more on the complex and competing interests of intellectual property law, and the
need to balance them, see Part IIA, supra.
87. Id.
88. Lear, 395 U.S. at 668.
89. Id. at 670-71, 673-74. The Court did at least profess to seek "an acceptable middle
ground" between the "two different worlds of contract and patent." Id at 668. However, the
Court missed an important opportunity to do so, instead basing its conclusion on its expressed
belief that patent law is simply more important.
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abolishing the doctrine of licensee estoppel as an automatic bar to
patent validity challenges, by examining the convergence-rather than
the perceived divergence-of contract and patent law.
In particular, the Court glossed over a few important doctrines of
contract law that could be used to address this very issue. 90 Already,
under standard principles of contract law, a licensee who seeks to
challenge the validity of the licensed patent could rightfully rely on
some of the contract doctrines discussed in this article at Part II(C),
supra. The licensee could claim that the contract lacked
consideration, that the licensor lacked the necessary "good faith and
fair dealing," or simply that the parties made a mistake.
Contract doctrine would supply a sufficient-and preferable-basis
for abolishing the doctrine of licensee estoppel as an automatic bar to
patent validity challenges. Recognizing that licensee estoppel may be
managed within the standard confines, and convergence, of contract
and patent law, would also leave open the possibility that, in some
cases, the licensee would simply not be able to satisfy the necessary
standard to challenge a licensed patent via the appropriate contractual
vehicle.9 1 This result would present a true balance of interests both in
the patent realm, and between patent and contract law.
B. Adding Civil Procedure to the Normative Balance
Certainly, allowing a licensee to sue at anytime for anything at
all is an entirely illogical conclusion that does not at all flow from
Lear. The Lear doctrine cannot be construed as per se conferring
standing or ripeness where they would not otherwise lie. Indeed the
Lear doctrine, while important in allowing more open access to
challenging patents, does not and should not be interpreted to do
anything more than remove one specific bar to patent litigation. Prior
to Lear, some courts held that a licensee, just by virtue of taking a
license, was forever estopped to deny the validity of the subject of
90. See id. at 669-70 (providing cursory-but generally dismissive-discussion on possible
contractual defenses). Note that while only a properly constituted federal court may invalidate a
patent grant, a state court may decide issues such as unclean hands under the contract (i.e., the
license).
91. In short, using the rationale promoted by this article, a former licensee or one in
breach would be allowed to sue for patent invalidity in federal court if the necessary declaratory
judgment standards (discussed in Part IV) are present. For an active licensee in good standing,
the available remedy-if any-should be a contractual one, brought under state law, and not a
right to federal subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance. Cf MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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that license.92 Now, in post-Lear jurisprudence, a former licensee, or
one in breach of its obligations, may challenge the validity of the
patent (or perhaps the copyright/trademark) if the party otherwise
satisfies jurisdictional requirements.93 Certainly, it would be as
misguided to allow a licensee to sue just based on that status as it was
to estop it for that reason.
94
This issue highlights the importance of adding civil procedure to
the balance at the intersection of normative values between contract
and intellectual property law, as discussed in Part II and illustrated in
Diagrams A and B, supra. At its core, civil procedure seeks to ensure
that proper jurisdiction is established in order to afford parties fair
access to courts without requiring parties to be hauled into court
inappropriately. 95 In general, in personam jurisdiction is somewhat
negotiable, 96 and therefore tends to fit well with the principles of
contract law and the private right of parties to willingly bargain away
their rights. This is demonstrated by contractual clauses regarding
choice of law and forum, which are generally permitted as a right of
contractual negotiation.97 However, there are exceptions, including
92. See United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310, 317 (1905); Automatic Radio
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950).
93. See Federal Circuit decisions on this topic. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874,
879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding challenge of jurisdiction okay because licensee breached first);
Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that without a breach of
contract, licensee had no standing); accord Medlmmune v. Centocor, 409 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2005), vacated sub nom., MedImmune v. Genentech, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549
U.S. 118 (2007). Cf MedlImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (holding that no
breach is necessary; however the jurisdictional test must be satisfied by licensee-plaintiff
initiating lawsuit). Naturally, once a jurisdictional challenge is overcome, substance must still be
proven.
94. Naturally, denial of jurisdiction frustrates licensees who want to challenge patent (or
copyright/trademark) validity without risking infringement liability. It would be inappropriate,
however, to allow a licensee-while shielded from infringement liability-to engage in the very
danse macabre that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000), is intended to
avoid, asserting its right to challenge the patent's validity, while the patentee is barred from
bringing its own action. The term danse macabre was first used to describe the plight of the
alleged infringer prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act by Judge Markey in Arrowhead Indus.
Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d. 731, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This reverse danse
macabre is exactly what the Supreme Court has unwittingly encouraged, however, in its January
2007 decision in Medlmmune. This article argues that, in doing so, the Court evidenced a
misunderstanding of proper perspective on the intersection of contract and intellectual property
law. See Part IV of this article, infra.
95. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292(1980).
96. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79.
97. Actual negotiation is generally unnecessary since the ability of the parties to negotiate
is presumed, absent some illegality as described in Diagrams A and B, supra, and Table II in
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where intellectual property (or other) norms conflict. In California,
there is a strict statutory policy against employee non-compete
agreements. 98 Therefore, at least one California court has invalidated
a choice of law clause that would opt for another state, in favor of
promoting California's strong interest in enforcing its statute.
99
Subject matter jurisdiction, meanwhile, is a much more rigid
value of civil procedure, and one that courts do not allow parties to
privately contract.100 In particular, courts have observed that parties
may not waive or confer subject matter, as they do in personam
jurisdiction, since it is not within the right or ability of the parties to
create jurisdiction by the court.10 1 In the realm of intellectual property,
this is illustrated by the example that a patent claim brought under
Title 35 presents a federal question, while claims brought under any
given state's codification of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act do not
present federal questions.10 2 The rationale is that either a dispute fits
Appendix (Tables), infra. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (public
policy favors "predictability" for parties-per Table II, infra); See also M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972) (forum selection clauses are prima facie valid).
98. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2000). The California Supreme Court
recently decided on an interpretation of the statute, reaffirming that covenants not to compete
are void, subject to several exceptions. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 189 P.3d 285 (Cal.
2008).
99. Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 85 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Cf Advanced
Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231 (2002) (refusing to interfere with judicial
proceedings instituted in another state to enforce choice of forum and non-compete clauses in an
employment contract, although also refusing to cede jurisdiction). See also Dix v. ICT Group,
Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1024-25 (2007) (rejecting forum selection clause that would have state law
consumer protection statute adjudicated in a jurisdiction that does not permit class-action suits in
such cases). The latter court noted: "Although forum selection clauses are prima facie valid, a
forum selection clause may be invalid if it violates the public policy of this state." Dix, 161 P.3d
at 1024.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) requires a court to dismiss an action at any time where it
appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, since it cannot be waived by the parties. The
defense may be raised by the parties or by the court at any time, even on appeal. Parties cannot
contract to invoke subject matter jurisdiction before or during litigation, since it raises the very
question of the court's authority to hear their case. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
101. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
("[N]o action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court."). See
also Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal
courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or by prior action or
consent of the parties.").
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2007) (also conferring federal jurisdiction on copyright claims
brought under Title 17 or trademark claims brought under Title 15). Of course intellectual
property rights brought under state statutes or common law must be brought as state law claims.
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the subject matter jurisdiction of a court or it does not-at least in
principle.'0 3
In reality, there is a great deal that parties can do, whether by
contract or unilaterally, to garner subject matter jurisdiction. Diversity
and supplemental jurisdiction create statutory exceptions allowing
federal courts to hear state claims. 10 4 Similarly, declaratory judgment
actions confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts where the
putative plaintiff chooses not to initiate suit, but the dispute is
otherwise ripe. 10 5 Between these various exceptions, there is an
emerging framework whereby parties may actually be able to create
subject matter jurisdiction in apparent contrast to the stated values of
civil procedure, yet entirely within the bounds of the law. This could
occur even by contract in an intellectual property license
agreement. 10 6 For example, while federal courts will not allow parties
to simply state by contract that disputes will be covered by federal
law, 10 7 the parties can arrange diversity jurisdiction. Similarly, while
federal courts would not accept a contractual provision that creates a
"case or controversy,"' 0 8 parties could agree upon factors that would
be considered hostile to the license-and that thereby would likely
create at least baseline declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 0 9 That
particular issue was not present before the Supreme Court in the 2007
Medlmmune case, and so it adds to the array of murky questions
surrounding the intersection of contract and intellectual property law,
and as on this issue, their convergence with the normative values of
civil procedure, analyzed in Table III, infra, in Appendix: (Tables),
and graphically illustrated in Diagram C.
103. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 802 (1988)
("[J]urisdiction is determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case
.... .).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2007) (diversity); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2007) (supplemental).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). The issue of declaratory judgment in the licensing context
was examined by the U.S. Supreme Court in January 2007 in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). The decision is examined further in Part IV of this article, infra.
106. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 118.
107. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-19 (1951).
108. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 126.
109. On oral argument, Justice Stevens asked "whether the parties could agree to create a
case or controversy." Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Medlmmune, 549 U.S. 118 (No. 05-
608) [hereinafter MedImmune Oral Argument]. This is an interesting question because even
where baseline declaratory judgment jurisdiction is established, the courts have discretion
whether to hear a case. Certainly jurisdiction must lie as a baseline matter, but of course it is the
parties who create the controversy by their words or actions.
128 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
DIAGRAM C
CONVERGENCE OF NORMATIVE VALUES BETWEEN CONTRACT DOCTRINE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
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C. The Utter Confusion
Although the U.S. Supreme Court sought to create a simplified
system with Lear,"t0 the decision instead created vast gaps in the
ability of licensing parties to predict outcomes for varying
behaviors." l l The confusion results from the Lear Court's incorrect
rationale. Instead of relying on contract law to reach its decision-as it
could and should have done-the Court stated that its decision was
actually based on what it deemed the preemption of federal patent law
over common law contract principles. 1 2 A proper decision based on
contract doctrine would reasonably have allowed licensing parties to
guide their future behaviors by the principles of contract law.1" 3
Instead though, the misguided rationale of the Supreme Court in Lear
110. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668-69 (1969) (seeking to "search for an
acceptable middle ground" between "two different worlds of contract and patent").
111. Brief of Licensing Executives Society (U.S.A. & Canada), Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 4-5, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (No.
05-608), 2006 WL 1355599 [hereinafter LES Amicus Brief in Medlmmune] (noting that while
"the decision provided some certainty ... it was unclear how broadly the decision would be
applied," and other issues "remain uncertain to this day").
112. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673-74. See Beyond Preemption, supra note 70.
113. LES Amicus Brief in Medlmmune, supra note I 11, at 2 (asserting contract law
"ensure[s] that each party to a license agreement. . . should understand from the outset their full
rights and liabilities under the ... agreement").
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has left licensors and licensees alike uncertain of the proper
boundaries of their transactions. 1 4 The result has been utter confusion
as to what exactly is acceptable behavior by the parties to a contract,
if the contract happens to be a license for intellectual property.'
1 5
Circuit splits have ensued, leading to the creation of the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982.116 The Federal Circuit, which now
hears virtually all patent appeals, should have been able to clarify the
confusion, yet the court has unfortunately taken an overly-formalistic,
and sometimes narrow tact, further adding to the disarray.
When the U.S. Supreme Court finally granted certiorari on a
licensing case this past term, there was some hope that the Court
would shed light on the undecided issues in licensing practice.'1 7 This
call for action is demonstrated by the amicus brief filed by the
Licensing Executive Society (LES).' 8 The LES represents thousands
of domestic and international company representatives, consisting of
both licensors and licensees." 9 Tellingly, the LES filed its brief "In
Support of Neither Party," simply seeking the certainty necessary to
properly settle the economic expectations on all sides.' 20 In particular,
the brief provides the following background in its plea to the Supreme
Court for firm guidance:
Licensees and licensors now often do not know prior to entering
into a license agreement whether, when, or how licensees will be
permitted to challenge patent validity. Similarly, licensees and
licensors often do not know to what extent licensors can prevent,
hinder, or ameliorate the impact of such validity challenges.' 2'
This is important to the valuation of a business deal as well as to
the expectations of parties after they have entered into the contract.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's January 2007 Medlmmune
decision did not directly address any of the issues raised by LES, a
careful reading-and a proper interpretation-of the Court's decision
may provide some guidance on how the issues can be resolved, as
proposed in Part V of this article, infra.
114. Id. at 4-5.
115. Id.
116. Dreyfuss, supra note 83, at 750-51 (noting the Federal Circuit was "created with the
avowed purpose of bringing greater uniformity and predictability to the patent law").
117. LES Amicus Brief in MedImmune, supra note 11l, at 2 (urging the Court to "issu[e] a
ruling that clarifies and explains the continuing validity and scope of the Lear doctrine").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. at 2.
121. Id.
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The most salient issues causing confusion among licensing
parties can generally be fit into the following five categories: 1) Does
Lear's abrogation of licensee estoppel (at least for former licensees)
apply to contractual covenants not to sue, if the covenant was reached
by a consent decree or legal settlement? If so, does the timing of the
agreement (pre-discovery for example) matter? 2) Can parties
contract around the abrogation of licensee estoppel by providing for
differential royalties based on the outcome-or even the filing-of a
patent invalidity challenge? 3) Must a licensee continue to pay
royalties during the pendency of a patent validity challenge? 4)
Should the abrogation of licensee estoppel be applied also to
copyright and trademark licenses? Finally, 5) can a licensee in good
standing to an active license invoke the Lear doctrine to sue for patent
invalidity without termination or breach?
1. Does Lear's abrogation of licensee estoppel (at least for
former licensees) apply to contractual covenants not to
sue if the covenant was reached by a consent decree or
legal settlement? If so, does the timing of the agreement
(pre-discovery for example) matter?
Appellate courts have differed in their opinions as to whether a
consent decree acts as estoppel to challenging patent validity, or on
the other hand, if such estoppel would be contrary to the Lear
doctrine. 122 During the decade following Lear, three different circuit
courts considered the question and came to different conclusions. The
Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeal held that a consent decree
acts as binding estoppel.123 The Seventh Circuit, however, found that
it would be antithetical to the tenets of Lear if a licensee could be
estopped from challenging patent validity, simply because the
"license" was couched as a consent decree.124 The Federal Circuit has,
since its creation in 1982 disagreed with the Seventh Circuit and
repeatedly allowed consent decrees to act as estoppel.121 With no
122. Gregory G. Kenyon, Patent Law: The Res Judicata Effect of Consent Decrees in
Patent Litigation-Lear, Inc. v. Adkins Takes a Back Seat-Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d
469 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 139, 159-64 (1992) (noting the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh circuits have ruled on consent decrees without uniformly interpreting Lear).
123. Interdynamics, Inc. v. Firma Wolf, 653 F.2d 93, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1981); Schlegal Mfg.
Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 779-81 (6th Cir. 1975).
124. Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1368-69 (7th Cir. 1974)
(acknowledging the public policy of allowing validity challenges to outweigh the policy of
finality in consent decrees).
125. Diversy Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Foster v.
Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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further Supreme Court guidance, there has been a lingering question
for licensing parties as to whether the Federal Circuit would some day
be overturned on this issue in favor of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
that Lear's policy is too strong to allow estoppel to flow from any
type of agreement. 1
26
Similarly, there is a remaining question as to whether a
settlement agreement can be used to estop a party from challenging
patent validity. Post-Lear, at least one Ninth Circuit decision declined
to invoke estoppel based on a settlement agreement signed in the
absence of litigation.'2 7 The rationale was, again, that it would be too
easy for prowling patentees to disguise licensing agreements as pre-
litigation settlement agreements and thereby to improperly skirt the
Lear doctrine. 128 Without directly disputing that holding, the Federal
Circuit in a later case declined to extend it to post-litigation settlement
agreements. 29 Hence, there has been some concern that licensors
have an incentive to file litigation first and invite a license later.
In fact, none of these questions are truly novel to contract law.
Although they have mistakenly been treated-including by the U.S.
Supreme Court-as patent issues, all are actually contract issues, and
can be dealt with by the basic principles of contract law, at its
convergence with patent law, as described in Part II(D) and (E) and
illustrated in Diagrams A and B of this article, supra. Employing the
same rationale that the Court should have implemented in Lear, these
persisting issues should simply be addressed using the standard
contract doctrines of consideration (including the settlement of good
faith disputes), mistake, and, where necessary, illegality.' 30 In most
cases, a settlement agreement with proper consideration should act as
126. But cf Kenyon, supra note 122, at 175 (arguing that the "Federal Circuit achieved a
reasonable balance between the valid federal interest in preserving the finality of judgments and
the patent policy of removing obstacles to suits challenging patent validity.").
127. See Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Adver. Co., 444 F.2d 425,
427 (9th Cir. 1971) (distinguishing a settlement agreement from a license is tricky since a
license agreement could easily be couched as a pre-litigation settlement).
128. Id.
129. Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding a
settlement agreement that settles litigation acts as estoppel to a licensee's challenge of patent
validity). See also Warrior Lacrosse Inc. v. Brine, Inc., No. 04-71649, 2006 WL 763190, at *25
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2006) (applying contract doctrine to find preclusive effect of settlement that
occurred early in litigation). Actually, there is no clear policy reason why consent decrees
should be treated as less binding res judicata than settlement agreements, since the consent
decree actually involves the court and is a "judicial act." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 115 (1932).
130. See discussion of Lear in Part III(A), supra, for more on how these standard
contractual doctrines could be applied to bar licensee estoppel in most cases.
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estoppel.131 Of course there could be exceptions, obtained through
contract challenge, including mistake where the patent is shown to
have been obtained by inequitable conduct, or is proven invalid by a
third party. 132 As to the supposed incentives of licensors to file
litigation first and invite a license later, that assumption overlooks the
rational patentee's distaste for multi-million dollar litigation likely to
result in a final determination of patent invalidity.'
33
2. Can parties contract around the abrogation of licensee
estoppel by providing for differential royalties based on
the outcome-or even the filing-of a patent invalidity
challenge?
One way that parties might be able to skirt the abolition of
licensee estoppel is to allow a licensee to sue for patent validity, but
with contractually-specified consequences. So, the parties may agree
upfront in the license itself that if the licensee brings an action for
patent invalidity (or, for that matter, for noninfringement or
unenforceability), then the terms of the license will change. The
license may provide for an increase in royalties if licensee brings suit.
131. See Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1369-70.
132. Id. On this point, the Federal Circuit has correctly stated: "Consent judgments [and
here, it could have added, "settlement agreements"] are interpreted according to general
principles of contract law." Diversy Lever, Inc. v. Ecolab, Inc., 191 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1999). As such, consent decrees should be given the presumptions of contract law-and, in turn,
should be subject to the same challenges as other contracts, keeping in mind the strong principle
of res judicata on judicial actions. In that regard, the Federal Circuit also has acknowledged the
need to consider the preclusive effect of consent decrees "narrowly." Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co.,
947 F.2d 469, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
133. A group of scholars has undertaken empirical research on patent litigation trends,
finding: "Total direct litigation costs for the median patent case with between $1 million and
$25 million at stake were $2 million per side in 2003." John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley,
Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 441 (2004)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Valuable Patents]. Another empirical sampling found that despite
the statutory presumption of validity, nearly one half of patents are adjudged invalid in final
court decisions, primarily for obviousness. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-08 (1998) (finding 46%
found invalid). A further study found Federal Circuit reversals of district court decisions to be
around 50%, adding to the uncertain outcome of litigation. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis
of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BEREKELY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1090
(2001). Other studies with varying methodologies over several time periods have reached
different conclusions on appellate reversal rates, but-as with all litigation-uncertainty for
litigants reigns regardless. See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051,
2076-77 (2007) (finding a 22.9% appellate reversal rate on the issue of obviousness
specifically); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 396-97 (2000) (finding a 22% appellate reversal rate
overall by the Federal Circuit).
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The license may even provide for resulting termination or event of
default-i.e., termination at licensor's option if licensee does not
promptly "cure" the default by dismissing the litigation.
These issues, again, are neither entirely new nor entirely
unanswerable if courts properly look to the intersection of contract
and intellectual property law. Already, almost since the time of Lear,
the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed parties to base the royalty rate
for a pending patent on the ultimate disposition by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. 134 In short, the Court allowed parties to contract
for a lower royalty in the event no patent ultimately issues on the
licensed technology. 35
Furthermore, it has been and continues to be common practice in
intellectual property licensing for parties to provide for milestone
payments, and in some cases increased royalties, contingent on the
outcome of the technology in the patent office and in the
marketplace.1 36 This is particularly common practice for university
licenses, which typically involve early-stage discoveries that have not
yet been proven either as legally patentable or as commercially
viable. 137 University licenses most often require the licensee to take
the full financial risk of pursuing a patent application and of
developing and marketing the technology. 38 In exchange, the
university offers the license at low cost, with royalties and milestone
payments to kick in only if the patent is issued and the technology
becomes lucrative for the licensee. 13
9
It is logical to extend this same reasoning to the reverse scenario.
So, whereas many licenses already require a licensee to pay increased
fees if a patent issues or becomes commercially lucrative, so should
licenses also be (at least potentially) enforceable if they provide that a
134. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil, 440 U.S. 257, 265 (1979).
135. Id. at 265-66. This willingness by the Court to enforce a gamble on whether a patent
will or will not issue is not to be confused with the Supreme Court's refusal to enforce a license
provision extending royalties beyond the term of an issued patent. See discussion of Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964), supra note 70. While this may seem inconsistent with the
notion that only valid patents should command exclusivity, it can generally be reconciled by
referring to trade secret licensing, which validly allows a licensor to charge royalties for a
process that is never disclosed and never expires yet is nonetheless subject to certain legal
protections.
136. Press Release, Foley Hoag LLP, Terms and Trends in University Patent License
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licensee pay decreased fees if a patent does not issue, or is not
commercially viable. Certainly, there is nothing in standard contract
doctrine to blanketly prevent this (although the licensee may attempt
contractual defenses such as failure of consideration). 140 Nor is there
really any overriding public policy reason in patent law to block it
(although antitrust claims may be invoked if relevant). 
1 41
3. Must a licensee continue to pay royalties during the
pendency of a patent validity challenge?
In the landmark Lear decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
discussed the question of whether (at least former) licensees, now
permitted to challenge patent validity, must pay royalty payments
owed prior to a final judicial determination of invalidity. 142 As the
Court stated: "The decisive question is whether overriding federal
policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be
required to continue to pay royalties during the time they are
challenging patent validity in the courts. 14 3 Although the question
might seem to be a literal one, the Court did not decide it that way.
While decreeing that a final adjudication of invalidity should avoid
royalty payments due after issuance, 144 the Court did not say whether
royalties must be paid-and if so, to whom-during the pendency of the
suit. In fact, the Court made two slightly inconsistent remarks on the
topic. First, the Court indicated that a licensee who stops paying
royalties-and thereby repudiates the contract-should be absolved
from further payment provided it obtains a final judgment of
invalidity. 145 Next, however, the Court stated specifically that "Lear
must be permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing after
Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity.."
146
140. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.9 (4th ed. 2004).
141. Additionally, courts should consider that, as with the trade secret scenario, the
licensee may obtain information, or perhaps services, from the licensor that otherwise would not
be accessible to the public. Courts should generally allow parties to make freely negotiated
contracts for potential patent rights that may not materialize as much as they allow contracts for
a price certain on oil futures, whose value could not yet be fully known to either party.
Meanwhile, licensing parties can also justify ongoing royalties that are based on exchanges
beyond just the patent right, by including trade secrets or other non-expiring services under the
umbrella of the license agreement. This same reasoning may be applied to copyright and
possibly trademark licenses, depending on the reason that registration is denied.
142. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969).
143. Id.
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This could be interpreted in two ways. First, it could mean that all
royalties-perhaps even ones already paid-must be disgorged to the
licensee once invalidity is proven. Or, it could refer back to the first
remark, which in the Lear case would have the same effect since the
licensee stopped paying royalties before, not after, the patent issued.
The right of the licensor to demand payment of royalties during a
validity challenge has been discussed by various courts, 147 with
varying conclusions. 148 In truth, a court properly employing contract
principles would find that this needs to be decided on a case by case
basis. It is rather specific to any particular contract as to whether
royalties should continue to be paid, and whether payment to an
escrow account constitutes breach. Under the schematic matrix
proposed by this article and set forth in Table V, infra in Appendix
(Tables), contract doctrine is the main determinant of outcome for
licensing challenges. Therefore, this individual question should turn
on the particular factors of a given challenge, such as whether the
challenge is based on lack of consideration, mistake, or other
contractual mechanism.
4. Should the abrogation of licensee estoppel be applied
also to copyright and trademark licenses?
There remains a question as to just how far Lear's abrogation of
licensee estoppel can-or should-be pushed. The Lear doctrine has
147. Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977)
(licensee may make royalty payments during validity challenge and then recoup them if
successful); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d 1, 7 (6th Cir. 1974) (licensee
may make payments into escrow account during validity challenge); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (licensor may terminate agreement where licensee is
paying royalties to escrow instead of to licensor).
148. The final word to date comes from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in an October
2006 decision. In the case of Go Medical Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264,
1273 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit stated that while a licensee need not pay royalties
during a patent invalidity challenge (but would still be liable for those past due if the challenge
is unsuccessful), the licensee may not invoke this protection "until it (i) actually ceases payment
of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of
royalties is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid." This decision is consistent
with prior Federal Circuit jurisprudence on the issue, such as Studiengesellschafi Kahle, M.B.H.
v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court in Medlmmune noted its
interpretation of Lear as stating that no royalties need be paid during challenge by a repudiating
licensee. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 124 (2007). In so stating, the
MedImmune Court may have missed the nuances of Lear, as discussed in this section of this
article. Furthermore, the Medlmmune majority acknowledged that it did not directly face that
issue, since the petitioner in Medlmmune was a nonrepudiating licensee who was still paying
royalties. Id.
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been applied by analogy to copyright licenses, 49 although not
uniformly. 150 In trademark cases, too, there have been varying judicial
determinations.'51 The confusion results from Lear itself. Specifically,
the Lear court based its decision on the precarious presumption that
patents dominate a market. 152 That presumption is incorrect.1
53
Congress specifically repudiated the presumption of patents as
automatic antitrust or misuse concerns, via the 1988 amendments in
PL100-703. 54 Furthermore, it is factually untrue that anyone who
holds a patent automatically dominates a market. Rather, in many
industries patent owners vie with one another simply to tread water in
the marketplace.
Following the reasoning of Lear, there is some question as to
whether copyrights fit the characterization of market dominance.
Indeed, the decisions following Lear would indicate that a court's
opinion on that issue is determinative of its decision on the respective
rights of the parties. One court opined that copyrights simply do not
enjoy the market dominance of patents, and therefore should not be
subject to the same policies blanketly encouraging validity
challenge. 55 A later court, however, criticized that statement, pointing
out that in certain industries a limited number of copyright owners
enjoy enormous market share.' 56 The later Twin Books Corp. v. Walk
Disney Co. 157 court therefore held true to Lear's abolition of licensee
estoppel on the theory that copyright licensees do not have sufficient
149. Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 877 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1995). As a
further restriction, the Lear doctrine has not been extended to assignor estoppel, which rests on
the distinguishable premise that one cannot both act in good faith to sell a right and then turn
around and claim that the right sold was a useless one. See Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico,
Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design Sys.,
Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
150. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1200-01 (7th
Cir. 1987) (enforcing covenant not to sue in copyright license agreement).
151. The doctrine of licensee estoppel has been applied to trademark licensees, even post-
Lear. See Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 561 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (8th Cir. 1977). But
other courts have refused to enforce express covenants not to sue in a trade certification license.
See Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2003).
152. See examination of Lear decision, supra Part III.A.
153. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
154. This added to the statutory list of nonobjectionable conduct for a patentee, codified in
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
155. Saturday Evening Post Co., 816 F.2d at 1200.
156. Twin Books Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 500.
157. Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 877 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
2008] RECONCILING CONTRACT DOCTRINE WITH IP. 137
leverage with the copyright owners/licensors to obtain a fair
negotiating position.'
5 8
In fact, it simply cannot be a generalized conclusion that patents
command more market power than copyrights. There are fewer
players, with much greater dominance, in the area of movie
production (copyright), for example, than there are in biotechnology
(patent), where typically each of many players holds a limited patent
on an incremental innovation. Accordingly, if the Lear court had
relied on standard contract principles-as it should have-instead of on
generalizations about patent owners, it would be easier to apply the
doctrine to other scenarios both in patent law and in the related fields
of copyright and trademark. Meanwhile, although the Lear court did
not base its decision on contract principles, certainly courts hearing
current disputes on the topic would be perfectly correct in doing so.
Courts should thoroughly review claims at the convergence of
contract and intellectual property law, such as failure of
consideration, mistake, and illegality. Where undue market
dominance is a possible issue, courts may consider misuse or antitrust
violations under the doctrine of contractual illegality. This can
properly be done only on a case by case basis however, and not as a
generalized presumption about a particular industry or branch of
intellectual property law.
5. Can a licensee in good standing to an active license
invoke the Lear doctrine to sue for patent invalidity
without termination or breach?
The issue has long been one of whether a licensee can be
permanently barred from challenging patent validity, or if not,15 9 what
steps a licensor may take to protect itself from such suit. 160 Recently,
the inquiry has expanded. In a trilogy of cases at the Federal Circuit
over the past three years, licensees have challenged patent validity
while still paying royalties, and otherwise remaining in good standing
under the license agreement.' 6' The interesting question was thus
158. Id.
159. See discussion, supra Parts III(A), III(C)(4). As determined by Lear for patents (see
Part III(A), supra), and sometimes extended to copyright and trademark, as discussed in Part
III(C)(iv) of this article, supra.
160. See discussion, supra Part III(C)1-3. These were the inquiries addressed in Part
III(C)(i),(ii), and (iii) of this article, supra.
161. Gen-probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (no breach, no
standing); accord MedImmune v. Centocor, 409 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated sub noma.,
MedImmune v. Genentech, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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raised as to whether a licensee must somehow be either a former
licensee, or at the very least, a licensee in breach, in order to invoke
the Lear doctrine encouraging patent validity challenges. One of the
three, Medlmmune, was heard on certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 162 The Court rendered its decision in January 2007. Although
the Court could-and probably should-have limited its holding to the
viability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, 163 instead it opened up
quite a can of worms in licensing with a broad and misguided
decision that flouted the practice of intellectual property licensing,
and unnecessarily disregarded relevant contract doctrine. Meanwhile,
the Court did not shed light on the many open issues in licensing
practice and law, which are analyzed in Table IV, infra, in Appendix
(Tables).
IV. THE MEDIMMUNE CONUNDRUM
A. The Federal Circuit's Misguided Standard
In the past three years, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has
decided a trilogy of cases involving. the right of a licensee to sue for
patent invalidity without first breaching or terminating the license
agreement 64 In each case, the Federal Circuit applied its self-styled
declaratory judgment (DJ) standard requiring that a DJ plaintiff have
"reasonable apprehension" of a lawsuit by the patentee before a DJ
suit can be ripe. 165 In doing so, the Federal Circuit rendered its own-
although perhaps not deliberate-version of the intersection of the
normative values of contracts, civil procedure, and intellectual
property law. 166 The Federal Circuit was incorrect in its rendition,
though, and therefore applied an improper DJ standard, far outside the
bounds of general jurisprudence. 167
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on one of the cases
this past term, Medlmmune v. Genentech.168 In its decision rendered
162. MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
163. The proper standard for invoking declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent disputes
is discussed more fully in Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment, supra note 2, at 963-64.
164. Gen-probe, 359 F.3d at 1381-82 (no breach, no standing); accord Medlmmune v.
Centocor, 409 F.3d at 1379, 1381, vacatedsub nom., Medimmune v. Genentech, 427 F.3d 958
(Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
165. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
166. Although it appears that the court did not consider it in such terms or it would more
likely have reached the correct conclusion in the first place.
167. See Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment, supra note 2, at 19-30, 36.
168. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 549 U.S. 118 (2007). Due to the similar (indeed
nearly identical) facts and issues of Medlmmune v. Centocor, one week after issuing its decision
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on January 9, 2007, the Court unsurprisingly-and correctly-scolded
the Federal Circuit for using a misguided DJ standard. 169 The DJ point
should have been sufficient, since it was the basis for certiorari."'
The Supreme Court need not-and, it turns out, should not-have gone
further. The DJ standard was a mere footnote for the Supreme Court
(literally, footnote 11), 171 which went on to give its own interpretation
of intellectual property licensing. Instead of considering and
balancing the normative values of contracts, civil procedure, and
intellectual property law, the Court dove into a confused discussion of
the perils of weak patents, 172 and the coercion supposedly pressed
upon unwitting licensees by abusive patent owners. 173
B. The Underlying Issue
Medlmmune licensed technology from Genentech via an
agreement executed in 1997.174 The license agreement defined the
licensed technology as including both an issued patent (known as
"Cabilly I"), and one pending before the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (known as "Cabilly II"). 1' In 2001, after fighting various
lengthy legal battles, Genentech finally obtained a patent grant from
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on Cabilly I1.176 Genentech
advised MedImmune of the "good news"-and of Cabilly II's
purported application to MedImmune's main product, Synagis®.177
MedImmune did not react by terminating its license agreement
with Genentech. Medlmmune did not stop paying royalties.
MedImmune did not breach the license agreement. But neither did
Medlmmune wish to be obligated to Genentech for the full patent
term of Cabilly II. Instead, MedImmune decided to test its luck with
in Medlmmune v. Genentech, Supreme Court vacated that Federal Circuit ruling as well, and
remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion in the Genentech case. Id.
169. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 137.
170. Id. at 122.
171. Id. at 132-33 n.11.
172. See id. 134-35.
173. See id. at 132.
174. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007).
175. Id.
176. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP (CTX), 2004 WL
3770589 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 26, 2004); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,331,415 B1 (filed June 10, 1988)
(issued Dec. 18, 2001).
177. These were the facts as considered by the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari, for
purposes of determining the appropriateness of declaratory judgment jurisdiction on
Genentech's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at
121-22.
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the courts. While still a licensee in good standing, MedImmune
initiated a declaratory judgment suit to invalidate Cabilly 11.78
Genentech opposed with a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the
motion based on Federal Circuit precedent. 7 9 The Federal Circuit
affirmed.18 °
MedImmune declared that it must be allowed to bring suit since,
after all, licensee estoppel had been abolished by Lear. 8 ' Genentech
countered-and the Federal Circuit agreed-that Lear merely allowed a
former licensee to sue after breaching or terminating a license
agreement. 182 A current licensee in good standing simply has no case
or controversy under Article 111.183 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.184
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court rendered its decision in MedImmune on
January 9, 2007. The decision made some progress in the area of
declaratory judgment standards for intellectual property disputes by
disapproving the Federal Circuit's favored "reasonable apprehension"
test. 18 On the issue of licensee estoppel, however, the 8-member
majority (and to some extent the Thomas dissent) evidenced a
fundamental misunderstanding of the interdisciplinary approach
necessary for resolving cross-over disputes such as those involving
178. Medlmmune, 2004 WL 3770589, at *.
179. Id. at *6. In particular, the court granted the motion based on the earliest case of the
trilogy which was decided by the Federal Circuit while this case was at the district court level.
See Gen-probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
180. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
181. Id. at 963-64.
182. Id. at 963.
183. Id. at 964-65.
184. The Supreme Court stated the question in its January 2007 decision:
We must decide whether Article IlI's limitation of federal courts' jurisdiction to
"Cases" and "Controversies," reflected in the "actual controversy" requirement
of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), requires a patent licensee
to terminate or be in breach of its license agreement before it can seek a
declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120-21 (2007). Although framing the
proper question, unfortunately, the Supreme Court confused the issues and gave the wrong
answer.
185. Id. at 132-33.
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intellectual property licensing' 86 That mistake led to a misguided and
incorrect holding.
Despite probing questions during oral argument, the Court's
decision did not properly frame the nature of the dispute.' 87
Disappointingly, the Court failed to appropriately characterize the
issue as being at the intersection of contracts, civil procedure, and
intellectual property law. Accordingly, the Court did not consider the
apposite normative values of each of these legal doctrines in order to
correctly balance them. Instead, the Court looked only briefly at
contract law. Then, eerily like its predecessor Court in Lear, the Court
cast aside the contracts analysis altogether, and instead clung to a
specious understanding of patent law and licensing practice.
Unfortunately but unsurprisingly, the Court's misguided analysis led
to an incorrect decision.
As with the Lear Court, the MedImmune majority first properly
inquired as to whether the petitioner had alleged a contractual
dispute.188 As with the Lear Court, the Medlmmune majority then
went on to ignore its own question.' 89 In doing so, as with the Lear
Court, the Medlmmune majority committed two fundamental errors.
First, the Court overlooked the importance of balancing the
normative values of contract law in its analysis, thereby relying
exclusively on patent law as the basis of its decision.' 90 The Court
simply did not take into account the importance of contract doctrine
in determining licensing obligations.' 91 This is unfortunate, since the
186. See id. passim.
187. On oral argument, the justices properly placed a heavy focus on the terms of the
contract at issue and how far a contract could go in restricting conduct by the patentee or by the
licensee. However, the interesting questions raised by the justices seem unfortunately to have
fallen by the wayside in their ultimate decision. Medlmmune Oral Argument, supra note 109,
passim.
188. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 123-25.
189. The majority simply inquired as to whether a contractual question had been
presented, briefly concluded that it had been mentioned in the briefs, and then went on to say,
"[h]aving determined that petitioner has raised and preserved a contract claim, we turn to the
jurisdictional question." Id. at 125.
190. The dissent did not even perceive a contract dispute. "As a threshold matter, I
disagree with the Court's characterization of this case as including a 'contractual dispute."' Id.
at 140 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. Some possible causes of action are discussed in Part 1I(C) of this article, and are
illustrated in Table I1, supra, including failure of consideration, mistake, and illegality. These
might be brought as a state law cause of action during the term of the license. Patent validity
could also be brought as a federal cause of action in a DJ suit by the licensee after termination or
breach. Despite the Supreme Court's misguided ruling to the contrary in MedImmune, an active
licensee in good standing does not satisfy the federal DJ standard of "actual case." See Re-
evaluating Declaratory Judgment, supra note 2.
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Court missed the opportunity to implement an interdisciplinary
approach that could be used not only in intellectual property
licensing, but effectively in any cross-over dispute, where legal
doctrines cross disciplines.
Second, the Court went further awry by failing to properly
analyze the balance of interests within patent law. As a result, the
Court's rationale rested on a misguided understanding of patent law
and of licensing practice. The Court mistakenly characterized a
licensing situation as inherently "coercive," and akin to government
regulatory action.' 92 This is incorrect. No one really believes that
licensors on aggregate hold more power in licensing negotiations than
do licensees who bring their products to market. Perhaps the Court
was mistaking the "troll" phenomenon for one where all patentees are
wildly outpacing technology users,' 93 but that is simply not the case,
and certainly in many situations licensees have more power than their
licensors. 194
192. Id. at 128-31. This really misses the mark, and demonstrates how the Court
overlooked contract law in its analysis. The Court should have recognized that a license to use
or practice intellectual property-like any other contract-is generally assumed to be a voluntary
agreement, freely negotiated, between informed parties. If MedImmune believed it had been
coerced into this particular licensing contract under duress, fraud, or some other illegality, it
should invoke these contractual defenses to rescind the contract as a matter of state law. The
Medlmmune Court was mistaken in believing that such coercion should be assumed simply
because the licensor holds a patent that is being used (voluntarily) by the licensee. Furthermore,
in a correct conclusion, the Court acknowledged that the Declaratory Judgment standard
previously used by the Federal Circuit for patent cases was overly restrictive and should be
aligned with that of general jurisprudence. Id. at 132-33 n.11. Hence, the licensee could sue for
patent invalidity under federal law but-as would be clear if the Court had taken the proper view
of contract law-that should be allowed only after the licensee has somehow repudiated the
contract. Ultimately, the licensee has many valid legal choices on how to proceed without the
Court providing a false one by its failure to contemplate contract principles in its discussion of
intellectual property licensing. The Court mistakenly relied on the earlier case of Altvater v.
Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1943), for its conclusion, which allowed licensees to challenge
a patent while still paying royalties. Altvater was based on a different premise though, since the
royalties were compelled by an earlier court injunction, and not by a voluntary license
agreement.
193. For further analysis on the "troll" phenomenon and its true implications as a hold-up
problem, see Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? (Stanford Pub. Law, Working
Paper No. 980776, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980776.
194. Although inaccurate in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court's characterization of
licensing as coercive follows its recent spate of rulings favoring user rights in technology, and
encouraging challenges to weak patents. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 202 (2005); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 392-94 (2006); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134-37 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727 (2007).
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Perhaps also, the Court was misled by one characterization of the
facts of this case. In particular, the Court acknowledged that
Petitioner had been confronted by its licensor with a letter expressing
the licensor's belief that Petitioner's activities were covered by
licensor's newly issued continuation patent. 195 The Court could have
viewed the letter as simple correspondence between two business
partners, or as a friendly update. Instead, the Court's decision referred
to this letter as a "clear threat."' 96 That characterization may well have
tipped the scale in favor of the majority's view of licensing as a
"coercive" action, but the Court was wrong to make that leap. 97
There is nothing inherently coercive about licensing negotiations, and
if the Court had properly considered contract doctrine in the balance,
it would have observed that licensing is a form of contract like any
other, that simply happens to be at the convergence of contracts and
intellectual property law, and should be subject to the standard tenets
of contract law, including, where relevant, duress, unconscionability,
or other illegality, as examined in Part II(D) and (E) and illustrated in
Diagrams A and B of this article, supra.
V. RECONCILING CONTRACT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
POST-MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH
News of the MedImmune decision spread rapidly through the
business community; however, the community's reactions are not yet
clear. In reality, the greatest shock on all sides was simply that the
U.S. Supreme Court focused its attention on an obscure aspect of the
case (licensing negotiation), and based its decision on an incorrect
assumption (that licensees are coerced into unfair agreements).
Certainly, the Court has caused confusion, and there is a need for
195. The newly issued continuation, known as "Cabilly II," had apparently been
contemplated by the parties and included in the definition of "Licensed Products" that would be
subject to royalty payments. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 121-22.
196. Id. at 122.
197. The characterization of the letter as a "clear threat" harkens back to the facts of a
somewhat analogous copyright case. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d
1542, 1556 & n. 23 (9th Cir. 1990). There, DJ jurisdiction was found appropriate by the Ninth
Circuit, even though, as in Medlmmune, the license was still active. Incidentally, although the
Medlmmune Court did not cite Hal Roach for this point, the case had been cited by Petitioner in
its brief, so it may well have affected the Court's reasoning. It is worth noting that the Thomas
dissent correctly disagreed with this characterization of licensing, referring to licensing instead
as "a voluntary choice to enter an agreement." MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 146 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Indeed there is no contractual-or other legal-bar against a "threat" of asserting a
lawful right brought in good faith. See Hackley v. Headley, 8 N.W. 511, 513 (Mich. 1881);
Alaska Packers' Assoc. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1902).
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legal damage control. That said, the decision may-and should-be kept
in proper perspective by courts, litigants, and license negotiators.
The cloud left by MedImmune derives from the Court's failure to
openly characterize (and perhaps failure to even recognize)
intellectual property licensing as being at the intersection of contract
and intellectual property law. In that omission, the Court missed a
great opportunity to reconcile their convergence, 198 as well as their
apparently diverging doctrines (that is, the convergence between
contractual illegality and intellectual property law).1 99 If the Court had
properly cast the issues, the proper doctrine would have naturally
followed. In the MedImmune case, that would have meant a denial of
even baseline DJ jurisdiction at this stage,200 and silence on the
question of whether the licensee has a contractual claim under state
law that may be invoked either now or later.2 0 1
The silver lining, though, is the reawakening to licensing as not
solely a creature of intellectual property. While the Court somewhat
muddied the waters, it is consistent with the MedImmune decision to
characterize contract law as properly governing intellectual property
licensing disputes.20 2 Although the Court did not ultimately make that
point clear, it did at least give some support for that proper
conclusion, 20 3 which can be carried forth by lower courts in future
intellectual property disputes, or indeed in the final resolution of this
one on remand.
Meanwhile, licensing parties remain largely unaware of the
desirability, or the possibility, of simply following standard contract
doctrine in their negotiations.0 4 Instead, they are struggling to
198. See supra Part If(C) and Diagram A.
199. See supra Part II(D) and Diagram B.
200. There was no federal question presented in a "concrete dispute" as to patent validity
where the licensee and licensor were actively engaged in a license agreement in good standing.
Although the Supreme Court misunderstood this and granted baseline DJ jurisdiction, it at least
left it to the district court on remand to consider a denial of DJ jurisdiction on discretionary
grounds. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136-37 (2007).
201. State law contract claims might include, for example, a possible claim of lack of
consideration; a possible claim of non-breach based on the scope of license as not including
licensee's present activities; and possible claims of illegality, including duress, as the Supreme
Court presumed in this case, but which should have to be brought as a contract claim for
rescission.
202. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 123 n.2.
203. See id.
204. See D. BRIAN KACEDON, LICENSING EXECUTIVES SOC'Y, RETHINKING PATENT
LICENSE AGREEMENTS IN THE WAKE OF MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH: PRESENTATION AT THE
2007 WINTER MEETING (2007), https://www.usa-
canada.les.org/meetings/2007winter/secure/docs/1 -f.pdf.
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understand the post-Medlmmune landscape without clear context.
20 5
This has lead to some unnecessary apprehensions. The LES presents a
good barometer of the sentiment in the business community post-
MedImmune since the group represents both licensors and licensees,
and therefore does not take a position favoring either side.20 6 Just a
few weeks after the January MedImmune decision was announced,
LES released results of a post-Medlmmune survey, revealing that 79%
of respondents (again, representing both licensors and licensees)
believed that licensees would now be "more likely" to challenge
patents after signing a license agreement. 20 7 Survey respondents also
apparently expect licensors to insert many barriers into post-
MedImmune license agreements in order to avoid patent validity
challenges, or at least to avoid being locked into a license while a
challenge is litigated.20 8
There are several reasons why this is a premature, and
furthermore unnecessary, scare. First, the Supreme Court did not say
that MedImmune will win its patent validity challenge. The Court did
not even say that the substance of the claim will ever be litigated. In
fact, on oral argument, the justices suggested that while the suit might
survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenge to dismiss on subject
matter jurisdiction, 20 9 it might not survive a Rule 8 challenge (or any
other number of possible procedural challenges).21 0 Second, even if
MedImmune's suit proceeds to verdict, it may be dismissed on
substantive grounds under contract doctrine, such as estoppel.21 '
205. Id.
206. The LES brief in MedImmune, which presented unresolved licensing issues (still
unresolved today, but mostly put on the back burner since the Supreme Court raised new, more
pressing issues), was filed, interestingly, "In Support of Neither Party." See LES Arnicus Brief in
Medimmune, supra note 111.
207. See Press Release, Licensing Executives Society (U.S.A. & Canada), Inc., Survey
Shows Supreme Court Ruling May Hinder IP Licensing (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.usa-canada.les.org/press/archives/3.15.07.asp (last visited June 6, 2007) [hereinafter
Survey]. The 79% includes those who say licensees would be "somewhat more likely" or "much
more likely" to challenge patents after signing a license agreement. It is unclear from the press
report how many of those responding were frightened licensors rather than prowling licensees.
208. Id.
209. On remand, the district court declined to dismiss on discretionary grounds.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
210. This issue was raised by Justice Ginsburg on oral argument in the Oct. 4 hearings on
MedImmune as to whether the licensee estoppel issue was really better addressed as a 12(b)(6)
motion, or even an 8(c) defense. See MedImmune Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 8, 40.
211. Contractual estoppel might be found on the ground that a licensee cannot both enjoy
the benefit of a license and litigate its validity simultaneously. This is distinguishable from
licensee estoppel (abolished by Lear), which would bar MedImmune from ever pursuing a
patent validity claim against its licensors. If a licensee were contractually bound by a license not
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Finally, there are simply the realities of licensing negotiations that
will face both frightened licensors and newly "empowered" licensees.
Certainly licensors will seek to include lots of litigation barriers
in their post-Medlmmune license agreements.212 Of course licensors
already, pre-Medlmmune, would include as many favorable clauses
for themselves as they could skillfully negotiate into a license. That is
simply the nature of negotiation. Licensors will try to include
covenants not to sue in their new license agreements.21 3 Licensors will
seek to include provisions where royalties rise if patent (or
copyright/trademark) validity is challenged.21 4 Licensors will try to
get more money upfront.2t 5 Most already did that pre-Medlmmune.
After all, even pre-Medlmmune, a bird in the hand was worth many
more in that unpruned bush of patent litigation, where validity could
be challenged by even a third party, thereby ending the nice stream of
royalty income in any given license.216
Licensees, meanwhile, will tend to fight for the diametrically
opposing provisions that favor them instead. Licensees will do as they
did pre-Medlmmune, negotiating for whatever provisions work in
their interest. Licensees will negotiate against covenants not to sue,
and indeed will instead try to negotiate covenants to sue, and perhaps
royalties that go down-or are owed in reverse by the licensor to the
licensee-if a suit is brought, and/or won by the licensee.2t 7 Some
licensees will actually bring suit, but probably not too many more
to terminate for any reason during the term of a patent (which was not the case for
MedImmune), then the licensee could attempt a contractual claim of illegality on the doctrine of
patent misuse. It is arguable, though, whether such provision would actually constitute patent
misuse, or simply savvy negotiating by the licensor. In either case, the licensee does have
remedies available for rescission, but must elect its course of action.
212. See Survey, supra note 207.
213. On oral argument, Justice Scalia alluded that a licensee's contractual covenant not to
sue might be enforceable, see Medlmmune Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 4, although
Justice Kennedy did not seem convinced. Id. at 5.
214. Another possibility raised by Justice Roberts is a provision raising the royalty rate
upon determination of validity. Id. at 7.
215. See Survey, supra note 207.
216. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 133, at 205 (finding that about 46% of litigated
patents are held invalid in final judicial action).
217. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens bandied about a few variations on this theme at oral
argument. Justice Ginsburg suggested the possibility of raising the royalty rate if a licensee sues
with a validity challenge. See MedImmune Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 10. Justice
Stevens brought up the possibility of a provision allowing the licensee to sue and withhold
royalty payments if it prevails. Id. at 33. Both are interesting possibilities.
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than they did pre-Medlmmune since the Supreme Court did nothing to
lower the costs, or to increase the certainties, of patent litigation. Is
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not really change the balance
of power in licensing negotiations. None of the potentially available
devices (covenant not to sue, etc.) was squarely addressed by the
Court in Medlmmune. Therefore, all are of unclear legal status. In
fact, they should all be allowed as a general rule under contractual
law, and in any given case may be disputed if necessary under such
contractual defenses as unconscionability, duress, misuse, or other
illegality. 219 These should be addressed on a case by case basis
though, and not as a generality in licensing law, since indeed every
individual license and negotiation will vary in its power balance as
well as its terms.
Interestingly, just after deciding the MedImmune case, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on another intellectual property
licensing case, Quanta v. LG Electronics.220 The Supreme Court heard
arguments in Quanta on January 16, 2008, and issued a decision on
June 9.221 The issue raised in the Quanta case is whether a sale of a
product may be made conditionally, or whether that violates the well-
established "first sale doctrine," also known as "patent exhaustion. 2 2
218. See Valuable Patents, supra note 133 (finding that "[t]otal direct litigation costs for
the median patent case with between $1 million and $25 million at stake were $2 million per
side in 2003."). While some licensees might now choose to both license and litigate, the
undertaking is expensive and risky. The Supreme Court's Medlmmune decision will more likely
impact troll licenses-also impacted by eBay already. So, the confluence of Medlmmune plus
eBay probably will mean more licensing instead of injunctions by troll licensors, and then more
declaratory actions brought by the licensee. Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit's precedent that fees
are still owed if challenge is dismissed is probably still the reigning law. See supra note 148.
219. See supra Part II.C and Table III.
220. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2006 WL 3877339 (Nov. 30, 2006),
pelitionfor cert. filed LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2109. The Supreme Court decision on the merits issued June 9, 2008.
Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).
221. Quanta Computer, 128 S.Ct. at 2109.
222. Id. at 2113. The "first sale doctrine" or "patent exhaustion" refers to the right of a
purchaser to use, resell, or otherwise transfer an item otherwise protected by patent. See Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917); United States. v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 252 (1942); cf Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d
700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that private parties maintain the freedom to contract
regarding conditions of sale). Copyright has a similar doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109
(2000), as does trademark, by analogy. Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d. 1443, 1448
(11 th Cir. 1998). A recently published article on the topic of licensing restrictions and the "first
sale doctrine" notes four ways that intellectual property is brought to the market: "Owners of
intellectual property can choose to sell the intellectual property, license the intellectual property,
sell products that embody the intellectual property, or license products that embody the
intellectual property." Elizabeth I. Winston, Why sell what you can license? Contracting around
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Unfortunately, as frankly disclosed by the Lear majority on the issue
of licensee estoppel, the lack of clarity on patent exhaustion has
similarly been plagued by years of inconsistent Supreme Court and
appellate rulings. 223 Fortunately, there was a solution available to the
Supreme Court in the Quanta case-and better yet, one that could be
useful in resolving the remaining open issues in intellectual property
licensing.224 Specifically, the Supreme Court had the ability to use the
Quanta case to fill in the gaps it left open after MedImmune. While
the Court naturally lacked the authority to rule on issues not present in
the case at hand,225 the Court could simply state the overriding
doctrine that it should have recognized in the Medlmmune case-that
is, that intellectual property licensing sits at the intersection of
contract and intellectual property law, which can-and should-be
resolved by applying the standard principles of contract doctrine,
226
for an interdisciplinary solution. Disappointingly, the Court missed
that opportunity again, simply presuming the primacy of patent
227doctrine. Interestingly though, the Court did make brief mention of
contract law in footnote 7 of the opinion, quoting an 1895 case for the
principle that, to the extent a contract action may be brought, "it is...
obvious that such a question would arise as a question of contract, and
not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent
laws., 228
Thus, although the Quanta Court missed the important
opportunity to consider a cross-over dispute at the intersection of
contract and patent doctrine, at least the Court left open the possibility
of considering contract claims (presumably under state law), as they
arise. 9 Characterizing these-and other licensing matters-as contract
disputes would still allow courts to take into account intellectual
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 93 (2006); see also
Jessica Litman, The Tales that Article 2B Tells, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1391 (1998).
223. This is demonstrated by the confusion caused between the cases cited in note 147,
supra, with different reactions by different courts purporting to apply the same doctrine of
patent exhaustion.
224. See supra Part III.B and infra Table III regarding open issues in licensing.
225. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9, cl. 1.
226. The suggestion to use contract doctrine to resolve the issues in the Quanta case was
made by a group of law professors (of which this author was one) in an amicus brief to the
Supreme Court. Brief of Various Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937), 2007 WL
4340884. The Federal Circuit did acknowledge the relevance of contract law. LG Electronics,
Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
227. See Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117.
228. Id. at 2122 n.7.
229. Id.
2008] RECONCILING CONTRACT DOCTRINE WITH I.P. 149
property doctrine, including antitrust and misuse issues that may arise
when a patentee abuses its position in order to control the end market
for its product or method. Such characterization would have the
benefit, meanwhile, of leading courts to correct holdings using
contract doctrine, instead of inconsistently trying to apply patent (or
copyright/trademark) law in a vacuum.2 30 Table V, in Appendix
(Tables), presents a compilation table, with an interdisciplinary
approach to resolving issues in intellectual property licensing
disputes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court has several times been remiss in its
treatment of intellectual property as a separate and discrete
discipline.2 31 In fact, intellectual property cannot and should not be
siphoned off from the normative framework of general jurisprudence.
In particular, the Court has misjudged cases involving intellectual
property licensing.232
Several times the Court has mistakenly viewed these cases as
involving pure intellectual property issues. This mischaracterization
overlooks the importance of viewing licensing cases as being at the
intersection of contract and intellectual property law, neither one to
the exclusion of the other. By missing this important opportunity, and
indeed need, for interdisciplinary analysis, the Court has failed to
provide the proper legal framework for courts, litigants, and license
negotiators.
This article attempts to fill that gap by probing the legal doctrine,
undertaking a normative analysis of the issues, and, finally, proposing
a comprehensive, interdisciplinary framework for examining what the
article terms "cross-over disputes," such as those involving
intellectual property licensing. By recasting the issues, and properly
viewing the need for an interdisciplinary approach, courts, litigants,
and license negotiators may use the tools provided by this article and
accompanying tables to reach a proper balance for more rational and
informed decisions.
230. Violations of such agreements, therefore, should properly be prosecuted by
intellectual property owners as contract, and not patent (or copyright/trademark) infringement,
actions.
231. See supra Part lI.D.
232. See Medlmmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118; see also Quanta, 128 S. Ct.
at 2115-17.
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APPENDIX: (TABLES)
TABLE I-BALANCE OF NORMATIVE VALUES BETWEEN PATENT, COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARK, AND TRADE SECRET.
233. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Questions and Answers,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/faq/p220026.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
234. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
235. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (2000).
236. Although, a patentee is not required to use or license a technology in order to
maintain the U.S. patent grant.
237. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000).
238. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000) (A person who independently creates can claim this
defense because he has not copied any of the author's work and therefore has not violated the
rights of the author).
239. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (a copyright term is 70 years beyond authors death; but work
for hire is earlier, for a term of 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation).
240. A federal registration, with grant, is necessary to maintain a Lanham action, 15
U.S.C. § 1121 (2000), but is not necessary for a common-law trademark claim in state court.
W.E. Long Co.-Indep. Baker's Co-op. v. Burdett, 126 S.E.2d 181 (W. Va. 1962).
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242. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2000) (term for trademark registration); 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a)
(2000) (registration is renewable).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2000) (prima facie evidence); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000)
("conclusive evidence" once mark becomes "incontestable" under 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000)).
243. The trademark may be renewed, 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2000), but must always be in
use, 15 U.S.C. § 1058(b) (2000). Also, since trademarks are granted by class, names may
coexist in different industries or classes. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000).
244. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d)(1) (Deering 2005).
245. See id. § 3426.1 (d)(2).
246. See id. § 3426.1(a).
247. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 4.02[ 1 ][d][vi][C] (2008).
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TABLE 11-BALANCE OF NORMATIVE VALUES IN CONTRACT LAW
NORMATIVE PRIVATE RIGHT COUNTERVAILING
VALUE TO DESIGN POLICY
CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS





Allow parties to set Favors private right




Encourage settlement Favors private right
of past and future to contract.
disputes .2 °
Avoid enforcement of Disfavors free-reign on




Require duty of good Disfavors free-reign on
faith and fair private right to set
dealing. 252 terms.
248. See Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
249. See generally Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958); Batsakis v.
Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Tx. Civ. App. 1949).
250. See Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah 1985); see, e.g., Brian
Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72 (Conn. 1978).
251. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (mistake); Austin Instr.,
Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (duress); Woollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W.
781, 781 (Ky. 1892) (unconsionability).
252. See Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1152.
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TABLE 111-NORMATIVE VALUES REPRESENTED IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW, CONTRACT DOCTRINE, AND CIVIL PROCEDURE.
NORMATIVE INTELLECTUAL CONTRACT CIVIL
VALUE PROPERTY PROCEDURE
SATISFY Fairly clear requirements Courts will Parties generally
REASONABLE for registration/ enforce parties' allowed to contract




ALLOW PARTIES Both ex ante (e.g., Parties may bet on Parties may contract
TO PREDICT agreements to assign) and future costs, or waive 1PJ.2 58
OUTCOMES ex post agreements (e.g., likelihoods,
assignments and licenses) etc. 257
are encouraged.
25 6
ENCOURAGE Parties are encouraged to Parties are Parties may create a
SETTLEMENT OF work out licenses with encouraged to case or






AVOID Prohibition on misuse, Prohibition on Parties cannot bind
ILLEGALITY antitrust, etc.262 unconscionability, court to SMJduress, etc. 263 without case or
264
controversy.
BALANCE Laws balance interests Common law and Title 28 provides
INTERESTS between creator, UCC provide statutory exceptions
253. See supra Table I.
254. See Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1150, 1153.
255. See Medtronic Inc. v. Janss, 729 F.3d 1395 (11 th Cir. 1984); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 469 A.2d. 867, 887 (Md. 1984).
256. See supra Part lI.D.
257. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958); Batsakis v. Demotsis,
226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tx. Civ. App. 1949).
258. See supra note 255.
259. Parties are especially incentivized to work out their differences post-eBay, since the
U.S. Supreme Court removed the presumption of injunctive relief Parties are also more
incentivized to work out a realistic and reasonable royalty post-Medlmmune since there is now a
lower bar to initiation of declaratory actions. Licensees may not actually be more likely to sue
(see analysis in Part V, infra, but at least they are more likely to be able to invoke the option if
they are unhappy with their licensing terms).
260. See Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah 1985); Brian Constr. &
Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72, 76 (Conn. 1978).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (diversity); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (supplemental); 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (declaratory judgment). See also discussion supra Part III.B.
262. See supra Part II.E.
263. See supra note 251.
264. See supra note 261.
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BETWEEN competitors, and missing or on SMJ (e.g.,
PARTIES/STAKE public. 2 65  preferred diversity,
HOLDERS/ construction; State supplemental




265. See supra Table I.
266. See supra Part II.E.
267. See supra note 261.
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TABLE IV-"THE ADVERSE CONTRACT"-OPEN ISSUES IN LICENSING
IP RIGHT LICENSEE'S LICENSOR'S LICENSOR'S LICENSEE'S
RIGHT TO RIGHT TO RIGHT TO RIGHT TO
CHALLENGE COLLECT OTHER CONTINUE
VALIDITY ROYALTIES PROTECTIONS LICENSE
DURING
CHALLENGE
PATENT Established by Some dispute 1. Not okay to Licensee's right
Lear's as to whether extend royalties to continue
abrogation of escrow is beyond term; 2 70  license during
licensee sufficient, but 2. May be okay to validity
estoppels. 26 8  licensee must bind licensee challenge was
pay until 271 established by
abrogates without grant; U.S. Supreme
license. 26 9  3. Raise royalty Court in
upon Medlmmune.273
challenge?2 72
COPYRIGHT Disputed-may Probably same Probably same as Will likely





TRADEMARK Disputed-may Probably same Probably same as Will likely






TRADE Likely. Likely, Term may be Will likely
SECRET especially if indeterminate or follow
stipulated by infinite. 2 78  MedImmune.
2 7 9
contract.
268. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1969).
269. Go Medical Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 1271 F.3d 1264, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Studiengesellschaft Kohle M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
270. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
271. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
272. This was discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court justices on oral argument of the
MedImmune case. Justice Roberts discussed the possible legality of raising the royalty rate upon
determination of validity. See MedImmune Oral Argument, supra note 109, at 7.
273. MedImmune v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135 (2007).
274. See Twin Books Corp. v. The Walt Disney Co., 877 F.Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal.
1995); cf Saturday Evening Post Co., v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc. 816 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir.
1987).
275. See infra note 287.
276. See Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. The Seven-Up Co., 561 F.2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.
1977). Cf Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.
2003).
277. See infra note 287.
278. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
279. See infra note 287.
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TABLE V-COMPILATION TABLE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO
RESOLVING ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING DISPUTES
LICENSING ISSUE INTELLECTU CONTRA CONVERGEN LITIGATIO
IN LITIGATION AL CT LAW CE OF N RESULT
PROPERTY INPUT NORMATIVE
LAW INPUT VALUES
Patent/copyright/trade Federal question Possible Contractual State law
mark/ established only bases for illegality as contract
trade secret is if"actual case contract reason to action.
invalid/not infringed or action: rescind. 2 8 1  No federal
and/or unenforceable, controversy." 1. Lack of question,
(action by licensee) 280 considerati unless "actual
on; case or










Breach for Not a federal Standard Implement State law
nonpayment. question. 2 83  state law reasonable contract
(action by licensor) contract expectations of action.
action, the parties. 284
280. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120-21 (2006) (Trade secret
claim, or a common law trademark claim, would be determined under applicable state law).
281. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (mutual mistake); Austin
Instr., Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (duress); Woollums v. Horsley, 20
S.W. 781 (Ky. 1982) (unconscionability).
282. In the recent MedImmune v. Genentech opinion, the Supreme Court determined that
baseline jurisdiction existed for a federal DJ action, even though the license was active and
unbreached. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that the action might not proceed either due
to discretionary DJ dismissal, or due to other procedural or substantive obstacles. Medlmmune,
549 U.S. at 126-127. See supra Part V of this article for a discussion on how to interpret the
ruling. Meanwhile, the decision may be distinguishable anyway since the Court saw a "clear
threat" by licensor to sue licensee if the contract were breached. So, it is possible to view the
decision as being based on that narrow ground. The decision would probably be the same for a
federally enforceable copyright or trademark. A trade secret claim, or a common law trademark
claim, again, would be determined under applicable state law. Meanwhile, in the 2008 Quanta
case, the Supreme Court quoted a decision from 1895, observing that a contract question would,
naturally, have to be treated as a contract question and not a patent question, even if arising
under the same intellectual property license. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128
S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008) (citing Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895)).
283. See infra note 284 for comment on Lear v. Adkins. Moreover, despite the Lear
Court's apparent belief that patent law trumps contract law in licensing cases, this issue should
properly be viewed as being at the intersection of contract and patent law, and generally
standard contract rules, including the convergence of contractual illegality and intellectual
property law (see supra Diagram B), should guide the Court's response.
284. See Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1150-53 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Breach for Not a federal Standard State law
nonconformance with question.2 8 5  state law 1. Encourage contract
license agreement: contract settlement of action.
1. Licensee sues action past and future
despite covenant not to disputes.
2 86
do so; 2./3. Parties
2. Licensee does not may contract to
observe trigger event predict future
on increasing royalty. 287
(action by licensor) outcomes.




Coercion to enter or Misuse/ Duress. Contractual State law
renew license Antitrust. illegality as contract
agreement reason to action. No






285. See infra comments in note 286.
286. See Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72, 75-76 (Conn. 1978) (holding
that when the party seeking greater consideration accepts a greater burden without a
corresponding increase in consideration, such an agreement is valid); Marton Remodeling v.
Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-08 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that courts "[f]avor compromise in order
to limit litigation").
287. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958) (acknowledging
that promises reasonably expected to induce future actions are generally enforceable, even
where consideration is lacking); Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) (holding that mere inadequacy of consideration alone is insufficient to invalidate a
contract).
288. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (mutual mistake); Austin
Instr., Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (duress); Woollums v. Horsley, 20
S.W. 781, 781 (Ky. 1892) (unconscionability).
289. See supra note 282.
* * *
